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CLIMATE REGULATION OF THE
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: A
COMPARATIVE VIEW
FROM AUSTRALIA, GREAT BRITAIN,
SOUTH KOREA, AND THE UNITED STATES
Lincoln L. Davies,* Penelope Crossley,** Peter
Connor,*** Siwon Park,**** & Shelby Shaw-Hughes*****
I. INTRODUCTION
In the face of the climate crisis, the future of the electricity
industry is vital. Globally, the electricity sector ranks first in terms
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for 25% of such
emissions in 2010.1 Among Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the figures are even
starker: electricity is the number one contributor to climate change
for this group, comprising 42% of GHG emissions.2
The trajectory of the electricity industry, moreover, is one only
of expansion. From the inception of the industry with the first central
power station, on Pearl Street in New York City in 1882, through
today, the electricity industry has only continued to grow. This, of
course, is a dual-edged sword. Access to electricity improves lives in
*
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Presidential Chair in Law, and Presidential Scholar, University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law. Many thanks to Emily Aplin and Suzanne Darais
for research and data collection support and assistance.
** Senior Lecturer, The University of Sydney Law School.
*** Senior Lecturer in Renewable Energy Policy, University of Exeter.
**** Assistant Professor, Kangwon National University School of Law.
***** Quinney Research Fellow, University of Utah S.J. Quinney
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1
IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2014, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds.,
2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/wg3/drafts/fgd/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-forpolicymakers_approved.pdf.
2
Recent Trends in the OECD: Energy and CO2 Emissions, INT’L
ENERGY
AGENCY
9
(2016),
http://www.iea.org/media/statistics/Recent_Trends_in_the_OECD.pdf.
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innumerable ways,3 but its broader environmental impacts can be
deeply problematic.4 Relevant to this tension, while global access to
electricity increased from 78% in 2008 to 84% in 2014,5 global
demand for power grew steeply from 10,092 terawatt hours (TWh) in
1990 to 19,562 TWh in 2012, and is expected to climb yet higher
still, to 29,442 TWh in 2030.6
Critically, as the electricity industry continues to grow, its shape
is also rapidly changing. This can be seen perhaps most prominently
in the makeup of electricity generation worldwide. While the use of
fossil fuels to produce electricity rose from 63% of generation in
1990 to 68% in 2012, that share is expected to decrease to between
55 and 66% of global generation in 2040, depending on the policies

3

See generally, e.g., J. Stuart McMenamin et al., Environmental
Benefits of Electrification and End-use Efficiency, 10 ELECTRICITY J. 26
(1997); Shonali Pachauri et al., Access to Modern Energy: Assessment and
Outlook for Developing and Emerging Regions, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR
APPLIED
SYSTEMS
ANALYSIS
(2012),
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/researchPrograms/Energy/IIASAGEF-UNIDO_Access-to-Modern-Energy_2013-05-27.pdf; B. Attigah & L.
Mayer-Tasch, The Impact of Electricity Access on Economic Development: A
Literature
Review,
PRODUSE
(2013),
http://www.produse.org/imglib/downloads/PRODUSE_study/PRODUSE%2
0Study_Literature%20Review.pdf; Randall Spalding-Fecher, Health Benefits
of Electrification in Developing Countries: A Quantitative Assessment in
South Africa, 9 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 53 (2005); Margaret Wilson
et al., A New Slant on Slopes: Measuring Benefits of Increased Electricity
Access in Developing Countries, WORLD BANK ENERGY SECTOR MGMT.
ASSITANCE
PROGRAM
(Feb.
2011),
https://www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/Final%20ESMAP%20Report%
20for%20grey%20cover%20February%202011_0.pdf.
4
See, e.g., World Energy Outlook Special Report: Energy and Air
Pollution,
INT’L
ENERGY
AGENCY
43-49
(2016),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WorldEnergy
OutlookSpecialReport2016EnergyandAirPollution.pdf.
5
World Energy Outlook 2009, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 128 (2009),
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2009/WEO2009.pdf;
World Energy: Energy Access Database, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2009)
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/energyac
cessdatabase/#d.en.8609.
6
World Energy Outlook 2014, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 208 (2014),
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO2014.pdf
[hereinafter INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 2014].
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that states implement and adopt.7 Likewise, from a climate
perspective, although the share of the worst GHG-polluting
generation fuel—coal—grew from 37 to 41% globally from 1990 to
2012,8 its portion of generaiton is expected to consistently shrink
going forward: to 38% in 2020, 33% in 2030, and then 29% in
2040.9 Similarly, global use of lower GHG-emitting renewable
sources increased from 1% in 1990 to 5% in 2012,10 and is expected
to climb to between 12 and 17% in 2040.11
Still, despite this changing—and expected greening—of the
electricity sector, climate emissions from power generation remain a
major threat. This is because of the industry’s expansive nature,
driven by both a growing world population and a concomitant rise in
demand for power, magnified by the increasing electrification of
global society. Indeed, while the overall proportion of coal-fired
generation is expected to decline in future years, it is almost a
certainty that the total amount of electricity production from coal will
increase. As the International Energy Agency projects, coal-fired
electricity production will grow from 9,204 TWh in 2012 to between
12,239 and 17,734 TWh in 2040—a 33 to 93% jump.12 This should
not come as a surprise, given the rapid industrialization of many
nations. China, for instance, has built an average of one coal-fired
power plant every seven to ten days in recent years,13 while India, as
of 2012, had 100 more coal plants than China in the pipeline.14
In short, there can be no question that the world’s climate
trajectory is tethered tightly to the future of the power industry. Any
7

See id.
Id.
9
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Chapter 5. Electricity, in
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016: WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, Figure
5.3
(John
Conti
et
al.,
eds.,
(2016),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2016).pdf.
10
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 2014, supra note 6, at 208.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
As U.S. Shutters Coal Plants, China and Japan are Building Them,
INST.
FOR
ENERGY
RES.
(Apr.
23,
2015),
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/as-u-s-shutters-coal-plantschina-and-japan-are-building-them/.
14
Lisa Friedman, India’s Plans for Coal-Fired Power Plants Soar –
Study,
E&E
NEWS
(Sept.
17,
2012),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059970017.
8
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effort to reduce climate change must address electricity directly, as
scientists and, increasingly, lawmakers across the world recognize.
In light of electricity’s key role in climate change, this Article
surveys climate regulation of the electricity industry using case
studies from four jurisdictions: Australia, Great Britain, South
Korea, and the United States. These jurisdictions offer a useful
platform for comparison because, while all four are industrialized
societies playing important roles in the global economy, each has
chosen a separate path for addressing the climate change effects of
this critical sector. Moreover, these states demonstrate varied ways
of how difficult maintaining consistent regulation of climate
emissions in the electricity industry has been to date.
This Article thus provides a window into global climate
regulation of the electricity sector by showing a variety of legal tools
curently used to address GHG emissions, from carbon tax and capand-trade mechanisms to renewable energy support regimes. This
Article’s contribution is threefold. First, it offers a primer on both
the electricity sectors and the climate policies of each of the surveyed
countries. Second, by tracing these countries’ policies, it offers an
introduction into global climate regulation of electricity. Third, by
juxtaposing the experiences of these four jurisdictions, the Article
points to both the areas of success and the challenges of mitigating
climate change through forcing technological change in the
electricity industry. Indeed, these case studies make clear several
lessons about the influence of climate regulation and its interaction
with the electricity sector: (1) jurisdictions are using a wide array of
policy tools; (2) those policy tools are rapidly evolving; (3) that rapid
change risks undermining the policies’ effectiveness; (4) policies are
affecting each other internationally, including through crosspollination and by changing electricity markets that are not
physically interconnected; (5) there are inherent limits on the
effectiveness of electricity climate laws, including their tension with
traditional energy regulation; (6) the design and details of these laws
influences their efficacy; and (7) the laws are changing the shape of
the global electricity mix, even as other forces are driving change as
well.
Six parts comprise the balance of this Article. Parts II–V are the
case studies of each of the respective countries surveyed. Part VI is
the analysis section drawing on the jurisdiction-specific case studies.
Part VII summarizes and concludes.
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II. AUSTRALIA
As one of the most vulnerable countries to the negative
environmental impacts of climate change,15 Australia historically has
sought to implement innovative solutions to addressing this problem.
It created the world’s first government agency to support the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and also established “the
world’s first emissions trading scheme (albeit at a state level).”16
However, in more recent years, the issue of climate change, and in
particular, the impact of climate change legislation on the fossil-fuel
intensive electricity sector, has become highly politicized and a key
focus of federal elections. In 2012, the first national Carbon Price
Mechanism was introduced by the Labor Party.17 This Mechanism
was then repealed in July 2014 following a change in government
and the election of the Liberal/National Coalition.18 This meant that
Australia was the first country in the world to repeal legislated action
on climate change.19
In its place, an Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) was
introduced. However, the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions
in the Australian economy—the electricity sector—did not
participate in the initial rounds of the ERF.20 This has led to
considerable regulatory and policy uncertainty within the electricity
sector, with state governments increasingly introducing or
15
See Ross Garnaut, Chapter 6: Climate Change Impacts on
Australia, in THE GARNAUT REVIEW 2011: AUSTRALIA IN THE GLOBAL
RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 121 (2011).
16
Anita Talberg et al., AUSTRALIAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY TO
2015:
A
CHRONOLOGY
(2016),
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/4590624/upload
_binary/4590624.pdf;fileType=application/pdf.
17
Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) s 100 (Austl.).
18
Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014, s 66
(Austl.); see generally Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act 2014
(Austl.).
19
Talberg et al., supra note 16.
20
State of the Energy Market 2015, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY
REGULATOR
1,
8
(2015),
https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/State%20of%20the%20energy%20mark
et%202015%20(A4%20format)%20–
%20last%20updated%204%20February%202016.pdf
[hereinafter
AER
2015].
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strengthening their climate change and renewable energy legislation
in an attempt to address climate change in the absence of effective
Commonwealth Government action. This has created a highly
fragmented approach, with layers of duplication and regulatory
overlap.
Since the end of 2016, one of the states operating within the
National Electricity Market, South Australia, has begun to experience
extensive blackouts, prompting a broad national review of energy
security within the National Electricity Market (the Finkel Review).21
Despite repeated calls from the energy sector, key stakeholders, and
market participants for the consideration of reintroducing a carbon
price or the creation of a national emissions trading scheme, these
calls have been ignored by the Commonwealth Government.22
Without such a scheme in place, it is difficult to see how Australia
can meet its international commitments to address climate change,
including from the electricity sector.
A. ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE
Under the constitutional settlement between the Commonwealth
Government and the Australian states at the time of Australia’s
federation in 1901, the regulation of electricity became largely the
purview of the Australian states.23 Thus, prior to the electricity
market reforms of the early to mid-1990s, vertically integrated, stategovernment-owned monopolies provided all aspects of electricity
supply, including generation, transmission, distribution, and retail
services to customers. During this period, each state had its own
agencies responsible for planning, developing, commissioning, and

21
See, e.g., Blueprint for Energy Security in the National Electricity
Market: Independent Review, COAG ENERGY COUNCIL (2016),
http://coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publications/d
ocuments/Independent%20Review%20ToR-%207%20October%202016.pdf.
22
Energy reform is urgent to avert systemic crises, CLEAN ENERGY
COUNCIL
(Dec.
13,
2016),
https://www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/news/2016/december/energy-reformneeded.html.
23
See Australian Constitution s 107.
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operating their own electricity supply system, with only limited
interconnection between the states.24
Several reviews of the electricity sector in the early 1990s found
the existing market structure inefficient, with low productivity and
high barriers to entry.25 This prompted negotiations between the
Commonwealth, states, and territories about the future governance of
the electricity sector and the need to implement market competition.
The product of these negotiations formed the National Electricity
Market Legislation Agreement (NEMLA),26 which sought to
introduce a uniform, single wholesale electricity market across
eastern and southern Australia, as well as to harmonize the laws and
regulations governing electricity supply in participating jurisdictions.
These reforms were designed to facilitate interstate trade, lower
barriers to competition, increase regulatory certainty, and improve
productivity within the electricity sector as it transitioned from
dominance by large, unbundled, state-owned monopolies to
privatized corporations. In 1996, the National Electricity Law (NEL)
was enacted27—in its own right, a major achievement because it was
only the second time cooperative legislation had been agreed to and
passed by the jurisdictions.28 Then, in 1998, the National Electricity
Market (NEM) commenced operation.
24
See Commonwealth, Senate Select Committee on Electricity
Prices: Reducing Energy Bills and Improving Efficiency, Parl Paper No
ISBN 978-1-74229-712-5 (2012) 2.10 (2012).
25
See Frederick G. Hilmer, Independent Committee of Inquiry into
Competition
Policy
in
Australia
(1993),
http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/National%20Competition%20Policy%20Review
%20report,%20The%20Hilmer%20Report,%20August%201993.pdf.
26
Australian Energy Market Agreement, signed 30 June 2004,
[2004],
https://web.archive.org/web/20130505164040/http://www.ret.gov.au/Docum
ents/mce/_documents/IGA_FINAL_(30JUNE2004)20040713100323200411
12162849.pdf. In 2004, the Commonwealth, state, and territory governments
replaced the NEMLA with the Australian Energy Market Agreement
(AEMA). This agreement sets the ongoing agenda for a transition from
standalone electricity systems to national energy regulation. The AEMA
also aims to “promote the long term interests of consumers with regard to the
price, quality and reliability of electricity and gas services.” Id. at 6.
27
National Electricity (South Australia) Act 1996, 44 (Austl.) sch. 1.
(1996).
28
See National Energy Market: A Case Study in Successful
Microeconomic Reform, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY MARKET COMMISSION 1, 31
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1. THE NATIONAL ELECTRICITY MARKET
The NEM is a wholesale electricity market through which
producers generate, sell, transmit, and distribute electricity across six
jurisdictions in eastern and southern Australia: Queensland, New
South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital Territory (ACT),
Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania. Despite its name, the NEM
is not a truly national market, with Western Australia and the
Northern Territory continuing to operate as separate markets, because
the long distance between these areas and Australia’s east coast make
efficient interconnection of the grids infeasible.29 The NEM is made
up of approximately “330 large generators, five state based
transmission networks (linked by six cross-border interconnectors)
and 13 major distribution networks that supply electricity to end use
customers,”30 with an aggregate installed capacity of 47,641 MW.31
These industry players are physically linked to over 9 million
residential and business customers in participating jurisdictions via
one of the longest continuous alternating current (AC) transmission
networks in the world.32

(2013), http://www.aemc.gov.au/getattachment/8c426f7d-ea5c-4823-9b86510dfd4e82dd/The-National-Electricity-Market-A-case-study-in-mi.aspx.
29
National Electricity (South Australia) Bill: Second Reading
Speech, S. Austl. Parl. Deb., L. C. 1481 (1996).
30
AER 2015, supra note 20, at 24.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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FIGURE 1. GOVERNANCE OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL
ENERGY MARKET

The institutional and governance structures of the NEM are
highly complex, as detailed in Figure 1. The key market institutions
include (1) the Council of Australian Governments Energy Council,33
33

This entity is made up of the “ministers from the Commonwealth,
each state and territory, and New Zealand, with portfolio responsibility for
energy and resources.” COAG Energy Council, Terms of Reference,
http://www.coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publicat
ions/documents/COAG%20Energy%20Council%20Terms%20of%20Refere
nce%20-%20FINAL.pdf. The original form of the COAG (Council of
Australian Governments) Energy Council was the Ministerial Council on
Energy (MCE), which was established on June 8, 2001. It was designed to
be the forum through which the Commonwealth, state, and territory ministers
having primary responsibility for energy matters could meet to formulate
national energy policy. The role of the MCE is described in cl 4 of the
Australian Energy Markets Agreement (AEMA) (as amended on 9 December
2013). Over the past fourteen years, three institutions have held these legally
enduring roles and powers: the MCE, from June 8, 2001 through September
16, 2011; the Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER), from
September 17, 2011 through December 12, 2013; and the COAG Energy
Council, from December 13, 2013 to present.
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which is the entity responsible for national energy policy; (2) the
Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), which is the entity
responsible for market development as well as rulemaking under the
National Electricity Law;34 (3) the Australian Energy Regulator
(AER), which is the entity responsible for implementing the rules,
monitoring, and ensuring compliance; (4) the Australian Energy
Market Operator (AEMO), which is the system operator and the
entity responsible for market development; and (5) the Energy
Consumers Australia (ECA), which is charged with promoting the
long-term interests of consumers and advocating on their behalf.35
These institutions must act in accordance with the National
Electricity Objective (NEO). The NEO, in turn, identifies several
specific objectives for the National Energy Market. These include
“promot[ing] efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use
of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of
electricity with respect to . . . (a) price, quality, safety, reliability and
security of supply of electricity; and (b) the reliability, safety and
security of the national electricity system.”36
The NEO has long been criticized,37 with questions increasingly
being asked about whether it is still fit to carry out its purpose. In
particular, many observers have expressed concerns that the NEO’s
narrow focus on the economic interests of consumers limits the
ability of the Australian energy market institutions to adequately plan
for the long-term future of the electricity sector, especially in relation
to growing environmental concerns and sustainability.38

34
While ostensibly this appears to be a mundane regulatory function,
the reality of the operations of the AEMC has been that of a chief
policymaker in relation to electricity in the NEM.
35
See, e.g., Energy market institutions, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF
THE
ENV’T
&
ENERGY
(2016),
http://www.environment.gov.au/energy/markets/energy-market-institutions.
36
National Electricity (South Australia) Act, supra note 27, at sch. 1,
s 7.
37
See, e.g., Penelope Crossley, Review of the Institutional
Governance Arrangements of the National Electricity Market, PUBLIC
INTEREST ADVOCAY CTR. (2015).
38
This may be contrasted with the position of the European Union
and China, which both include a focus on sustainability within their
equivalent provisions.
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2. AUSTRALIA’S ENERGY MIX IN A TIME OF MARKET
TRANSFORMATION
The need to prepare for a changing energy mix is acute in
Australia, particularly because the Australian electricity sector is one
of the most carbon-intensive in the world. In 2014–15, black and
brown coal generators accounted for 54% of registered capacity
within the NEM and supplied 76% of all output.39 Gas-powered
generators accounted for 20% of registered capacity but only 12% of
production.40 By contrast, hydroelectric generators accounted for
16% of registered generation and supplied just 7% of output, while
wind accounted for 6.6% of registered installations but only 4.9% of
production.41
Despite the current carbon intensity of Australian electricity
generation, the above figures are somewhat misleading because
small-scale renewables are exempt from registration in the NEM.
Taking these resources into account reveals that Australia is currently
undergoing a profound electricity market transformation. Over 1.5
million homes currently have residential photovoltaic (PV) solar
panels, accounting for the highest penetration of residential PV solar
in the world.42 In fact, in its 2014 State of the Energy Market Report,
the AER observed that “solar PV generation reduced grid
consumption by 2.9%” in the 2013–14 financial year alone.43 This
trend is expected to continue, with AEMO projecting growth rates in
photovoltaic solar installations of approximately 24% annually over
the next three years.44 Further, the first large-scale commercial solar
plant came online in 2015, with many more now in the planning or
construction phases.

39

AER 2015, supra note 20, at 27.
Id.
41
Id. at 29.
42
Id. at 30.
43
State of the Energy Market 2014, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY REGULATOR 1,
23
(2014),
https://www.aer.gov.au/system/files/State%20of%20the%20energy%20mark
et%202014%20-%20Complete%20report%20(A4)_0.pdf [hereinafter AER
2014].
44
National Electricity Forecasting Report for the National Electricity
Market, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY MARKET OPERATOR I, ii (2014),
http://www.aemo.com.au//media/Files/PDF/NEFR_final_published_Nov_2014.pdf.
40
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In addition to the rapid growth of PV in Australia, there is
emerging development and commercialization of grid-scale and
residential energy storage. While energy storage is already costcompetitive in some rural and remote areas of Australia,45 UBS
predicts that it will be cost-competitive for residential electricity
consumers by 2018.46 Indeed, AGL Energy has suggested that 3
million customers will be either wholly or partially off-grid by
2030.47 This is likely to have profound impacts on the NEM—and
the roles played by the institutions governing it.
B. DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY
As the fifth-largest exporter of coal and largest consumer of coal
per capita in the world, Australia contributes heavily to global carbon
emissions.48 Despite this, climate change policy in Australia is
highly politicized and the source of much debate in federal
elections.49 In turn, this has created significant regulatory uncertainty
at the Commonwealth level—effectively, a political seesaw over
what climate policy in Australia will be.
For example, under the Clean Energy Act of 2011, the Gillard
Labor Government introduced the Carbon Pollution Reduction
Scheme, which came into force on July 1, 2012. This scheme—
which set an effective price on carbon of $23 AUD per ton50—was
designed to shift from a fixed to a floating carbon price under an
45

See Jonathan Gifford, Solar Plus Storage Becoming “New
Normal” in Rural and Remote Australia, RENEWECONOMY (Dec. 4, 2014),
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/solar-plus-storage-becoming-newnormal-rural-remote-australia-59236.
46
Giles Parkinson, UBS: Australian Households Could Go Off-Grid
by
2018,
RENEWECONOMY
(May
9,
2014),
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/ubs-australian-households-go-grid-2018.
47
Giles Parkinson, AGL Energy Pick New CEO with Eye to Solar
and
Storage,
RENEWECONOMY
(Nov.
18,
2014),
http://reneweconomy.com.au/2014/agl-energy-pick-new-ceo-with-eye-tosolar-and-storage-35344.
48
New Report Reveals that Australia Is Among the Worst Emitters in the
World, CLIMATE COUNCIL (May 18, 2015),
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/new-report-reveals-that-australia-isamong-the-worst-emitters-in-the-world.
49
Talberg et al., supra note 16.
50
Clean Energy Act 2011, supra note 17.
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Emissions Trading Scheme after three years. This policy was highly
successful in reducing carbon emissions, with the Australian Energy
Regulator reporting that in just two years of operation, the scheme
helped reduce “output from brown coal fired generators . . . by
16 per cent (with plant use dropping from 85 per cent to 75 per cent),
and output from black coal generators . . . by 9 per cent.”51 At the
same time, the market share of coal-fired generation “fell to an
historical low of 73.6 per cent of NEM output in 2013-14,” which in
turn “led to a 10.3 per cent fall in emissions from electricity
generation over the two years that carbon pricing was in place.”52
However, following a change of federal government, the Carbon
Pollution Reduction Scheme was repealed in July 2014, and an
alternative Direct Action policy was introduced by the Abbott
Liberal/National Government.53 Following the repeal, Australia’s
carbon emissions rose for the first time in three years, increasing by
4.3% through June 2015.54
Frequent changes to climate action are not uncommon in
Australia. As the Research Service at the Australian Parliamentary
Library has described:
Australia’s commitment to climate action over the
past three decades could be seen as inconsistent
and lacking in direction. At times Australia has
been an early adopter, establishing the world’s first
government agency dedicated to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions; signing on to global
climate treaties the same day they are created;
establishing the world’s first emissions trading
scheme (ETS) (albeit at a state level); and
pioneering an innovative land-based carbon offset
scheme. But at other times, and for many reasons,
Australia has erratically altered course: disbanding
the climate change government agency, creating a
new one then disbanding that; refusing to ratify
global treaties until the dying minute; and being the
first nation in the world to undo legislated action
51

AER 2015, supra note 20, at 8.
Id.
53
Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act, supra note 18;
Carbon Farming Initiative Amendment Act, supra note 18.
54
AER 2015, supra note 20, at 8.
52
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on climate change, with the repeal of the Carbon
Price Mechanism.55
In short, climate action in Australia has hardly been consistent. That
is true across all areas of climate change regulatory policy, and in the
electricity sector in particular.
This has led to the Australian states and territories creating their
own climate change initiatives, with significant variability among the
different jurisdictions. For example, the ACT has committed to
achieve 100% renewable energy by 2020.56 South Australia and
Queensland seek to achieve 50% renewables by 2025.57 And
Victoria is targeting a 40% goal by 2025.58
This divergence among subnational governments has created real
issues within the context of the National Electricity Market, as some
states have elected to both encourage very high levels of deployment
of intermittent renewable generation and shut down their older coalfired generators. However, due to the lack of a coordinated national
approach, some states are at times dependent on their ability to
import baseload fossil fuel generation on an interstate basis across
the interconnectors. This, of course, limits the ability of exporting
states to change their own energy mixes.
Despite the zigzagging nature of its climate policy, Australia is a
signatory of the Paris Agreement. Still, even then, the bipolarity of
the nation’s approach to climate mitigation remains: Australia has
agreed to reduce its emissions in the form of an Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution of 26 to 28% of 2005 levels by 2030,59 and
55

Talberg et al., supra note 16.
Policy Options for Australia’s Electricity Supply Sector — Special
Review Research Report, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH. 1, 19
(2016),
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/prod.climatechangeauthority.gov.a
u/files/files/SR%20Electricity%20research%20report/Electricity%20research
%20report%20-%20for%20publication.pdf [hereinafter Policy Options].
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Towards a Climate Policy Toolkit: Special Review on Australia’s
Climate Goals and Policies, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T CLIMATE CHANGE AUTH. 1,
41
(2016)
[hereinafter
Policy
Toolkit],
http://climatechangeauthority.gov.au/sites/prod.climatechangeauthority.gov.a
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it ratified the Paris Agreement on November 9, 2016.60 But meeting
its emissions reductions target will be difficult in the absence of an
ETS. Instead, Australia, for now, will rely on two key mechanisms:
the Emissions Reductions Fund and the Renewable Energy Target.
1. THE EMISSIONS REDUCTION FUND
The primary mechanism currently used in Australia to reduce
emissions is the Emissions Reductions Fund (ERF). The ERF was
enacted in 2014 via amendments to the Carbon Credits (Carbon
Farming Initiative) Act of 2011 and the Carbon Credits (Carbon
Farming Initiative) Regulations Act of 2011, with a recent addition in
the form of the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Rule of
2015. It is a voluntary scheme that aims to provide incentives for the
adoption of new practices and technologies that reduce emissions,
with the intent of helping Australia meet its 2020 emissions reduction
target—5% below 2000 levels—for the second commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol.61
The ERF has three key elements: crediting, purchasing, and a
safeguard mechanism.
Registered participants can earn one
Australian carbon credit unit (ACCU) for each ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent (tCO2-e) stored or avoided by an eligible emission
reduction project. In order to claim ACCUs, the emission reduction
project must conform with the requirements of an approved
emissions reduction method. Methods have already been established
for a wide range of activities, including agriculture, transport, oil and
gas, and the “combustion of coal mine waste gas . . . , improving the
energy efficiency of commercial buildings and industrial facilities,
reducing energy demand of small users, flaring landfill gas, [using]
alternative waste treatment, reforesting and revegetating land and
managing savanna burning.”62 The Commonwealth Government has
committed $2.55 billion AUD for purchasing ACCUs,63 with further
60
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funding possibly available under future budgets. This provides the
main source of demand for ACCUs.
Any eligible registered project may participate in the competitive
reverse auction process used for ACCUs, which is run by the Clean
Energy Regulator.64 Successful bidders under this process, which is
designed to ensure that ACCUs are purchased at least cost, are
awarded a carbon abatement contract of up to ten years’ duration.
Under these contracts, the government purchases the ACCUs earned
by the project.65 In order to prevent bidders from overstating their
projected volume of ACCUs, successful bidders must purchase the
shortfall amount of ACCUs on the secondary market in order to
make good their contractual obligation. There have been three
auction rounds thus far under the ERF, with the government
contracting 143 MtCO2-e of emissions reductions from 348 projects,
at an average price of $12.10 AUD per ton66—at a total cost of $1.7
billion AUD.67
The third element of the ERF is the safeguard mechanism, which
took effect on July 1, 2016.68 The safeguard mechanism ensures that
emissions reductions purchased through the ERF are not offset by
significant increases in emissions elsewhere in the economy. It does
this by encouraging large businesses (so-called “responsible
emitters”) not to increase their emissions above a baseline, which
will ordinarily be “the highest level of reported emissions over the
five years ending in 2013–14.”69 The baseline may be increased “to
accommodate economic growth, natural resource availability and
other circumstances.”70 For new investments coming online after
2020, “baselines will be set with reference to best practice.”71 In
Press
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meeting its obligations under the safeguard mechanism, a responsible
emitter can either (1) ensure that its facility does not exceed its
baseline, (2) generate its own ACCUs under the ERF to meet the
shortfall, or (3) purchase ACCUs on the secondary market and then
surrender them to offset the emissions. This regulatory measure
applies to over 370 facilities across a broad range of industries that
create direct emissions of over 100,000 tCO2-e per year, including
electricity generation, mining, oil and gas, manufacturing, transport,
and construction and waste,.72 These facilities collectively account
for approximately 50% of Australia’s emissions.73
2. THE RENEWABLE ENERGY TARGET
The other policy mechanism used in tandem with the ERF is the
Australian Renewable Energy Target (RET), which is “projected to
reduce emissions by about 200 Mt CO2 e (cumulatively) between
2015 and 2030.”74 The RET was enacted under the Renewable
Energy (Electricity) Act of 2000, the Renewable Energy (Electricity)
(Small-scale Technology Shortfall Charge) Act of 2010, the
Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Large-scale Generation Shortfall
Charge) Act of 2000, and the 2001 Renewable Energy (Electricity)
Regulations. It is essentially a “technology pull” scheme requiring
liable entities to buy renewable energy certificates to meet their RET
liability. The RET is divided into two components: the Small-scale
Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) and the Large-scale Renewable
Energy Target (LRET).
a. The Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme
The SRES creates a financial incentive for residential
households and small businesses to install eligible small-scale
72
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renewable energy systems such as solar water heaters, heat pumps,
solar PV systems, small-scale wind systems, or small-scale hydro
systems.75 Eligible small renewable systems may create Small-scale
Technology Certificates (STCs) at the time of installation, for the
amount of electricity the systems are expected to produce or displace
during the system’s expected lifespan.76 For example, eligible PV
solar systems are permitted to create, at the time of installation, one
STC for each megawatt hour (MWh) of eligible renewable electricity
over fifteen years of the expected system output.77 The government
has legislated demand for STCs, with RET-liable entities that have an
obligation under the LRET also having a legal requirement under the
SRES to buy STCs and surrender them.78 Individual owners of
renewable energy systems rarely create and sell the STCs themselves.
Rather, accredited installers typically create the STCs and then sell
them in larger bundles, offering either a discount on the installation
price or cash to the owner in return.79
b. The Large-scale Renewable Energy Target
Similar to the SRES, the LRET creates a financial incentive for
the installation and expansion of renewable energy generators,
including wind farms, concentrated solar thermal projects, and
hydroelectric power stations. It does this by legislating demand for
Large-scale Generation Certificates (LGCs) through annual targets
that must be met by liable entities, such as electricity retailers.80 In
short, the LRET is what other jurisdictions may refer to as a
renewable portfolio standard (RPS), a renewable energy standard
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(RES), or a renewable obligation (RO).81 Under this scheme, one
LGC can be created for each MWh of eligible renewable electricity
produced by an accredited renewable power station.82 LGCs can
then be sold to liable entities, which surrender them annually to the
Clean Energy Regulator to demonstrate compliance with the RET
scheme’s annual targets.83 The revenue earned by the renewable
energy generator from the trading and sale of their LGCs is in
addition to that received for the sale of the electricity generated.84
c. The RET Review
In 2014, Australia held an expert RET Review chaired by Dick
Warburton, the former Chairman of Caltex Oil in Australia.85 The
Review was launched after the electricity industry raised concerns in
the context of declining electricity demand and greater energy
efficiency, including the charge that the LRET’s volumetric
requirement of 41,000 GWh of production from large-scale
renewables by 2020 was too high. The industry projected that
approximately 27% of electricity would come from renewables,86 an
amount significantly higher than the 20% originally intended when
the RET was designed. The Review found that the RET “had led to
the abatement of around 20 million tonnes of carbon emissions and,
if left in place, would abate a further 20 million tonnes of emissions
per year from 2015 to 2030—almost 10 per cent of electricity sector
emissions.”87 However, the Review found that while the cumulative
impact on household energy bills over the period of the RET was
likely to be small, the RET was “an expensive emissions abatement
tool that subsidizes renewable generation at the expense of coal fired
81
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electricity generation.”88 The Review thus recommended that, to
protect existing generators, the RET be revised to a “real 20 per cent
target” for large-scale renewable generation (equivalent to
approximately 33,000 GWh), rather than using the current 41,000
GWh production target. The Review suggested this 20% target be
achieved through a series of yearly targets, set one year in advance
and corresponding to 50% of growth in electricity demand.89 On
June 23, 2015, these changes were adopted through legislative
amendments to the existing RET scheme.90
C. CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Australia’s electricity sector accounts for almost 35% of
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions.91 Yet the Australian Energy
Council92 recently suggested that to keep global warming to less than
2 degrees Celsius will likely require Australia to reach “net zero
greenhouse gas emissions over the next few decades.”93 Such an
ambitious effort will require significant change within the Australian
electricity sector, which is currently dominated by highly emissions
intensive generation. Indeed, in 2013, “the emissions intensity of
Australia’s electricity supply was around 85 per cent above the
OECD average and around 11 per cent above that of China,” with
electricity emissions “projected to remain flat to 2020.”94
More problematic, two of the most successful Australian climate
change policies used to reduce emissions from the electricity
sector—the price on carbon and the RET—have either been entirely
repealed or significantly scaled back. This has had a direct and
tangible impact on the electricity sector. While coal-fired generation
88
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output fell by 12% over the two years that carbon pricing was in
place, the output of brown coal rose by 10% from 2014–15 after
carbon pricing was abolished.
By contrast, the ERF appears to have had less of a direct impact
on electricity generators than other policy initiatives, particularly
prior to the introduction of the safeguard mechanism. No electricity
generation projects participated in the first two rounds of ERF
auctions.95 Beginning in July 2016, however, the electricity industry
became subject to a sector-wide baseline as part of the safeguard
mechanism. The baseline was set by reference to the sector’s highest
historical annual emissions over the reference period.96
The effectiveness of this safeguard mechanism as an efficient
means of reducing emissions remains to be seen. What is clear is
that given the long timeframes and high capital costs associated with
investments in the electricity sector, stakeholders need more
regulatory and policy certainty if Australia’s electricity industry is to
reduce its emissions intensity going forward.

III. GREAT BRITAIN
97

Great Britain (GB) is a pioneer in moving its energy sector into
private hands and creating consistent standards for operating its
energy markets. Great Britain’s membership in the European Union
(EU) has had significant implications for its energy and
environmental policy, influencing its adoption of targets for both
95
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reducing climate change emissions and increasing renewable energy
production. The likely withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK)
from the EU creates significant uncertainty regarding ongoing
commitments in both of these areas. A number of UK politicians
have already raised the possibility of a clearing of environmental and
other regulations subsequent to withdrawal. The future of climate
regulation in Great Britain, then, is murky indeed.
A. ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE
Globally, Great Britain was one of the first jurisdictions to
liberalize its electricity sector. The 1989 Electricity Act divided the
publicly held utilities and passed most of them into private hands.98
Generation was sold to two private companies specializing in fossil
fuel generation and to one nuclear company, which retained its
government subsidy. State-owned regional distribution and supply
became privately held, the former as regulated monopolies and the
latter competing for consumers. Three transmission companies
emerged from the privatization. Two smaller grids in Scotland are
now owned by Scottish & Southern Electricity Networks and by SP
Energy Networks. The transmission network in England and Wales
is owned by National Grid plc, which also acts as the GB-wide
System Operator, with responsibility for all aspects of balancing the
grid. The privatization also created the Office of Electricity
Regulation (OFFER), which in 2000 merged with the gas regulator to
create an overarching energy regulator, the Office of Gas and
Electricity Management (Ofgem).
The primary purpose of this restructuring was to minimize
electricity costs by ensuring competition and applying rigorous price
controls to network regulation. Over time, however, Ofgem’s
priorities have evolved, reflecting rising social concerns over
equitable and environmental issues such as fuel poverty and climate
change. Most recently, security of supply concerns related to the
UK’s falling capacity margin also have become particularly
politically salient and are now reflected in Ofgem’s priorities.
Since privatization, the initial three generation companies have
been joined by many others. Over 90% of power consumption is
supplied by the “Big Six” companies: the French state provider
98
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EDF, RWE and Eon (both German), Scottish Power (Spanishowned), and British Gas and SSE, both of which are listed on the
London Stock Exchange. Each of these companies has traditional
thermal as well as renewable generation arms, with EDF also
importing some power through a 2 GW interconnection with France.
Further interconnections tie Great Britain to the Netherlands (1 GW),
Northern Ireland (500 MW), and the Republic of Ireland (500 MW).
Plans for further interconnections are currently underway.99 The UK
also continues to have a nuclear fleet, but with one exception, that
fleet is nearing the end of its life, so its capacity has begun to
diminish.100 The current government supports the growth of new
nuclear capacity, in part as a way to address both climate change and
energy security. This position can be seen most prominently in the
government’s support for new reactors in a partnership between EDF
and a Chinese company, the so-called Hinkley Point C plant, which
will have a 3.2 GW capacity, or roughly 7% of all UK generation.101
This project is scheduled for opening in 2026, and the UK
government plans for further development of up to 16 GW more in
nuclear capacity with these partners and others.102
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It is important to note that both energy policy and climate change
policy in Great Britain are strongly influenced by commitments at the
European level. The main routes of influence are via collective
negotiations concerning delivery of targets for emission reductions
and for renewable energy uptake, and via the adoption of directives
to formalize agreements that can touch upon both areas. Thus, EU
directives (essentially acts of law at the EU level) establish targets,
but EU Member States decide how to reach their agreed national
goals via policies selected at their own national levels. There are,
however, some limits on the latitude Member States enjoy. One key
limit is EU legislation on State Aid. This legislation restricts how
national spending can be directed, with the specific goal of
preventing Member States from directing funds preferentially to
benefit national competitiveness.103
Significant EU legislation impacting UK energy policy includes
the 2001 and 2009 Renewable Energy Directives,104 the 2012 Energy
Efficiency Directive,105 the 2004 CHP Directive,106 and the 2001
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Large Combustion Plant Directive.107 A new renewable energy
directive is expected to be agreed to shortly, codifying Member State
commitments on renewables for the period beyond 2020.
B. DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY
As a signatory to both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris
Agreement, the United Kingdom has agreed to substantially reduce
its climate emissions. Specifically, the United Kingdom agreed to
aim for a reduction in emissions of 12.5% against the 1990 baseline
under the Kyoto Protocol, and eventually achieved a 22% reduction
in the target period of 2008-12.108 Post-Kyoto, the EU’s current
20:20:20 commitments seek to reduce emissions by 20%, stimulate
energy consumption from renewables by 20%, and improve EU-wide
energy efficiency by 20%, all by 2020. Under the 2009 EU directive
legislating these goals, the United Kingdom agreed to an emissions
reduction of 16% by 2020 against 2005 emissions.109 The United
Kingdom ratified the Paris Agreement in November 2016, and has
also taken some of the steps required by Member States to implement
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plans to achieve appropriate emission reductions under the
Agreement post-2020.110
Although EU Member States have wide latitude to select their
own policy instruments to meet these goals, the EU itself has erected
its own measures to facilitate compliance. The most notable shared
instrument for climate change emission reduction is the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). The EU-ETS is a cap-andtrade approach to emissions reduction. It applies to bodies with
significant energy use, including power stations and factories, across
all twenty-eight EU Member States, plus Norway, Iceland, and
Liechtenstein. Thus, it covers sectors accounting for almost 50% of
CO2 emissions. Under the scheme, all applicable parties are assigned
emissions allowances, and excess emissions require purchase of more
allowances while excess allowances can be sold to other parties. The
mechanism has been repeatedly criticized for affording an
overabundance of allowances, a resulting low carbon price, and the
effect of undermining incentives for innovation in low carbon
energy.111
UK commitments to reduce climate emissions do not hinge
entirely on international and EU treaties, however. The UK
previously set for itself a legally binding national target of reducing
emissions by 80% by 2050, against its baseline 1990 figures,112
exercising its right to adopt a more ambitious goal than required by
its EU commitment. Progress against these figures is reviewed
through a five yearly carbon budget. Currently, in the second budget
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period, the UK must reduce emissions by 50% by 2025 and 57% by
2030.113
To achieve both its EU and domestic targets, the United
Kingdom has developed and implemented a suite of policy devices.
These include laws on renewables, energy efficiency, carbon pricing,
and emissions performance.
1. RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
The government introduced its first policy to incentivize
large-scale renewable energy sources for electricity (RES-E) in 1990:
the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), an auction mechanism for
contracts on a per MWh basis.114 Specifically, the NFFO offered
contracts to RES-E technologies on a competitive basis within
technology categories.115 A primary objective of the NFFO was to
subsidize the nuclear sector, which had fallen on economic hard
times following the 1990 privatization, with renewables acting as
something of a fig leaf for this provision.116 Using this program, the
government collected roughly £1 billion per year from 1990 to 1998
using a tax applied to consumers via supply companies, with nuclear
claiming 99% of this initially, although that proportion fell to 90% in
1998. RES-E accounted for the remainder until an EU ruling that
forced the government to cease nuclear support and cut the NFFO to
around £100 million a year, solely for RES-E.117
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In 2002, the United Kingdom replaced the NFFO with the
Renewables Obligation (RO), an RPS-style mechanism using
tradable green certificates (TGCs). The RO was initially technology
neutral and engendered upticks in RES-E capacity, particularly wind
energy and biomass, which were the cheapest options available.118 In
2009, however, the government amended the RO to encourage a
broader range of technologies, most notably offshore wind, after a
review suggested that this technology was essential to achieving the
EU-mandated RE targets.119 Specifically, the 2009 amendments
adopted a new “banding” structure for the RO, removing the initial
technology-blind approach and instead setting technology-specific
targets within the umbrella RO renewable energy goal.120
The RO aimed primarily at deploying larger scale RES-E,
with an attempt to apply it to smaller applications leading to poor
administrative efficiency.121 Thus, in 2010, the government added a
feed-in tariff (FIT), which sought to support smaller scale
installations of up to 5 MW. The FIT was immediately effective. It
118
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led to rapid growth in PV particularly, aided by a global downturn in
PV prices that coincided with the FIT’s introduction. The result was
an increase in PV capacity from 10 MW in 2010 to 11.4 GW in
December 2016.122 However, while the rapidly falling global price
of PV panels aided the FIT’s success, it also provided a tough
political test for this mechanism, since the compensation levels set by
the law quickly fell out of line with real world price drops, which in
turn led to excessive payments and uncapped expansion of total
public costs.123 Indeed, controversy soon erupted over reductions in
the tariff as the government tried to bring down the level of support
while seeking to balance continued renewables growth and cost
effectiveness. Nonetheless, growth in RES-E deployment under the
FIT continued, even with various rounds of cuts to the tariff rate,
although further substantial cuts in January 2016 appear to have
flattened growth through that year.124
Currently, the RO is being phased out and replaced with a
new mechanism, Contracts for Difference (CfD), to comply with
E.U. legislation requiring minimization of costs for supporting RESE by all EU Member States by 2017.125 The CfD applies a
competitive auction for contracts for new RES-E generation.
Winning bids receive the difference between a reference price
(representing the market price based on the day-ahead market) and
the strike price (which is set by the highest winning bid in each
technology category). This policy device comes with its own risks.
High market prices mean it is possible contracted generators might
have to pay funds back to the contracting party. There thus remains
an onus on the contracting generator to maximize income from
122
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electricity sales, since it is possible to earn below the amount of the
reference price.
Further, as with the NFFO, the CfD ties
subsidization of new nuclear capacity and RES-E support together. It
is possible this may cause problems for RES-E in the future, as the
total fund is now capped through the Levy Control Framework
(LCF).126
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Further, the CfD also includes the expected subsidy spending on new
nuclear power stations. Since there is considerable uncertainty concerning
when new nuclear capacity will come online, this creates problems with
predicting drawdown from the LCF. To address this, a strike price of £92.50
(2012 prices) was agreed to for all power from the UK’s first new proposed
plant, Hinkley Point C, rising with inflation and available for the first thirtyfive years of production. A second nuclear facility at Sizewell would
engender a price of £89.50 (2012 prices) for production across both plants.
This has led to at least one commentator to suggest that the LCF is poorly
designed and already in need of reform, while acknowledging the political
difficulties of supporting environmental goals in an era of squeezed incomes.
Public subsidy for carbon capture and storage (CCS) was originally tied into
the LCF mechanism. However, this was withdrawn in 2015.
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2. ENERGY EFFICIENCY
The UK also has committed to improving energy efficiency as
part of its obligation under EU climate change policy. Accordingly,
the government has introduced a number of policy instruments on
energy efficiency, including the Climate Change Levy (CCL). The
CCL is a simple tax, introduced in 2001 and applied to all electricity,
coal, and gas delivered to commercial and industrial consumers. The
CCL was initially set and frozen at 0.43p/kWh, but since has been
increased in line with inflation from 2007.127 Thus, by increasing the
total price of electricity, the CCL sought to decrease power
production from carbon-emitting sources and, in turn, drive down
GHG emissions. Renewables initially were exempted from the tax,
providing them with a slight competitive advantage.128 However,
beginning in 2015, electricity production from renewables was made
subject to the tax.129 Electricity from nuclear power has been subject
to the tax since its introduction.130
3. CARBON PRICING
The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) that introduced the CfD
also implemented other mechanisms aimed at mitigating the climate
change impacts of Great Britain’s electricity market. Most
prominently, the carbon floor price (CFP) was introduced with the
intent of providing stability for carbon prices that the volatile EUETS failed to afford. Specifically, the CFP set a minimum carbon
price in the UK, with the idea that this would incentivize low carbon
technologies. As Figure 2 details, the initial UK carbon floor price,
established in 2012, exceeded many projections of the EU-ETS price
going forward. Despite this excess, in 2014, the government
127
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announced that it would freeze the CFP at £18/tCO2 from 2016 to
2019 in order to avoid undermining national competitiveness.131 This
change reflects the shift in the UK from a coalition government to a
Conservative government following the 2015 elections.

FIGURE 2. INITIAL PROJECTION OF CFP VERSUS EU-ETS
PRICES

4. EMISSIONS PERFORMANCE
The other relevant Electricity Market Reform mechanism is the
Emissions Performance Standard (EPS). The EPS will place an
upper limit of 450 grams of CO2/kWh132 on emissions from new
power stations, unless the facilities are CCS-enabled. This is because
the UK presently considers CCS a useful method for maintaining its
fossil-fuel-thermal-generation fleet while continuing to decarbonize
production. Initially, in 2007, the government offered a £1 billion
subsidy to bring a CCS-enabled power station online by 2014.133
However, because of concerns over cost escalation, no contract was
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signed.134 A later attempt in 2012 to offer a capital subsidy of £1
billion to two preferred bidders, with additional support from the CfD
mechanism, likewise failed. In late 2015, the government withdrew
unexpectedly from the arrangement, citing a lack of funding.135
Now, no further progress is expected. Given the EPS, this suggests
that no new coal-power stations will be built in the United Kingdom
in the short- or medium-term.

C. CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Although the UK has used a number of policy devices over time
to regulate the climate impact of the electricity sector, there are a
number of important commonalties that can be drawn from them.
This is perhaps most apparent in the government’s successive
adoptions of the NFFO, RO, and CfD as the main instruments for
promoting large-scale renewable electricity installations.
First, the motivation for adopting both the RO and the CfD
reflects the government’s goal of minimizing interference with the
wider electricity market. Subsidies through the RO had to be won
competitively, while generators also competed in the electricity
market. Similarly, the CfD requires RES-E generators to maximize
market value. By contrast, as with other FIT schemes across Europe,
the British FIT mechanism directly interferes with the cost
prioritization of energy sources in the market, since the scheme
compels supply companies to pay for all power from eligible FIT
recipients. Precisely because of this, the government resisted a FIT
to support large-scale RES-E in favor of the RO, and only relented
when the RO proved too expensive administratively for promoting
smaller scale installations.136
Second, the selection of these mechanisms to support RES-E
reflects a deep political tension in Britain between ensuring low-cost
energy and mitigating climate change. Just as there is clear evidence
that the RO’s methodology of creating a market for certificates was
favored for minimizing market interference, it is likewise plain that
this preference for market function reveals a political desire to keep
134
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136
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costs down. The same desire can be seen in the selection of the CfD
and the explicit rejection of a FIT as an alternative. It also has been
argued that the top-up element of the strike price within the CfD will
mean that RES-E (and contracted nuclear) generators will be
incentivized to continue generating, even when the market price
becomes negative. This has not yet happened in Britain, but
increasing volumes of intermittent generation may make it a
possibility in the future, where high production intersects with low
demand. The top-up element of the CfD actively incentivizes
generators to produce more power when less supply might be
preferable. Addressing this concern, the government has now ruled
that CfD contracts do not pay out where prices fall below zero, and
that no strike prices will be paid in periods where negative pricing
persists for over six hours.137 Nonetheless, where the price remains
low but above zero, there remains the issue that RES-E generators
with CfD contracts will be incentivized to keep generating until the
market price hits zero, as they will continue to receive the full strike
price for each unit generated.
Third, the actual operation of these devices shows how difficult
matching policy design to desired performance can be. The RO was
selected on the basis that its competitive elements would provide the
greatest downward pressure on costs, thus minimizing taxpayer
burden.138 In retrospect, however, evidence comparing performance
of quota regimes like the RO and tariff mechanisms in Europe
suggests this choice did not achieve the optimal economic efficiency
that was one of the key justifications for its adoption.139 This was, in
part, why a FIT became necessary, in addition to the desire to
promote smaller scale installations. The government has since
welcomed the auction format of the CfD to encourage RES-E
generators to engage with the market to maximize income, thus
making effective management of their companies even more
important. As noted above, however, operational problems may arise
137
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as this approach progresses, though it is too early to draw
conclusions.

FIGURE 3. U.K. ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION BY FUEL INPUT,
1980-2014140

Despite these lessons, the UK met its Kyoto Protocol targets
each year from 2008-2012.141 This was a result of the shift to gas
generation, mild weather, and an increase in renewable energy
generation. Specifically, the UK achieved an overall reduction of
34.9% in GHG emissions from 1990 to 2014.142
It should be emphasized that the majority of this displacement
was driven by economic rather than environmental motivations, even
as national policies seeking to limit emissions were instituted. The
UK benefitted in meeting its emissions reduction targets from a
phenomenon known as the “dash for gas.”143 That is, the 1990
140
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liberalization of the electricity market created the opportunity for
new supply companies to diversify and for new sector entrants to
generate and sell power.144 The most cost-effective way to generate
power at the time was through construction of combined-cycle gas
plants, which benefitted from smaller scale and modularity, resulting
in lower bulk-capital costs and comparatively low gas prices.145
Further, since the 2008 global economic downturn, the UK has
reduced electricity consumption and enjoyed the attendant emissionreduction benefits.146 Figure 3 details both these effects.

IV. SOUTH KOREA
The Republic of Korea, commonly known as South Korea
(hereinafter Korea) has achieved economic growth through its heavy
dependence on energy-intensive and export-oriented industries. As a
result, this nation quickly has become one of the world’s largest
energy consumers and a major greenhouse gas emitter, ranking
seventh in the world for both categories in 2013. To address these
trends, beginning in 2008 Korea has initiated a series of active
policies and measures to combat climate emissions, including Asia’s
first nationwide cap-and-trade system. Yet despite these efforts, the
Korean electricity sector’s overall dependency on fossil fuels really
has not changed. Even under the much-publicized “Green Growth”
initiative, the government permitted dozens of new coal-fired power
plants to meet its projected energy demand. Going forward, then,
finding a way for the Korean government to bridge the discrepancy
between its progressive climate policies and its more traditional
electricity policies remains a key challenge.
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A. ELECTRICITY SYSTEM AND GOVERNANCE
Korea has achieved dramatic economic growth over the past few
decades, which in turn has led to an ever-increasing demand for
energy. In 2015, Korea was the ninth largest consumer of primary
energy in the world147 and the eigth largest consumer of electricity
globally.148 On both counts, this ranks Korea as the eighth-largest
consumer of energy in the world.149 Despite its high energy
consumption, Korea’s domestic energy reserve is limited. Korea
imports more than 95% of its fuel from foreign countries, making it
one of the top energy importers globally.150 Indeed, in 2014, Korea
was the second largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the
world, the fourth largest importer of coal, and the fifth largest net
importer of total petroleum and other liquids.151
Fossil fuel-fired power plants make up a significant portion of
the country’s installed generation capacity. Although natural gasfired plants account for the largest proportion of the nation’s
generation fleet, baseload generation is provided mainly from coal
and nuclear power, while natural gas meets peak demand.152 Overall,
natural gas accounts for 28.7% of installed capacity, while coal
makes up 28.2% and nuclear 22.2%.153 By contrast, the current
generation mix of Korean electricity production is 39.1% coal, 30%
147
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nuclear, 21.4% natural gas, and 1.5% oil.154 Hydropower and
renewable energy account for only 4.1% of electricity production.155
The state-owned Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)
controls almost all aspects of electricity generation, transmission,
distribution, and retail sales in Korea. In 2001, KEPCO’s generation
assets were divided into six separate subsidiary power generation
companies. Although this initial restructuring included plans to
subsequently divest KEPCO of these subsidiaries, the reform stalled
in 2004, and KEPCO still owns each of them.156 Besides KEPCO, a
few independent power producers (IPPs) participate in the Korean
electricity market. KEPCO and its subsidiaries produce about 83%
of all generation, and IPPs produce the remaining 17%.157 The Korea
Electric Power Exchange (KPX), also established in 2001 as part of
the electricity sector reform, coordinates the wholesale electric power
market and determines prices sold between generators and the
KEPCO grid. Generation companies compete to sell power into an
hourly auction pool operated by the KPX, with KEPCO acting as a
single buyer. The auction pool is a “cost-based pool,” meaning that
154
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the generation companies are required to bid at their variable cost of
operations.158 However, end-use electricity prices in Korea are
heavily regulated by the government,159 are not necessarily tied to the
actual cost of service, and remain far below the levels of other
economically developed countries.160 That is, the electricity tariff
pricing system, designed to protect agricultural and industrial
consumers, historically has not reflected the true costs of generation
and distribution, and has not provided incentives to conserve
electricity.161 While the Korean consumer price index increased by
254% from 1982 to 2011, electricity prices increased by only 30% in
the same period.162
Within the government, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Energy (MOTIE) leads energy policy development and
implementation. The Basic Energy Act had governed all aspects of
the country’s energy policy until the new Framework Act on Low
Carbon and Green Growth (Framework Act) was enacted in 2010.163
158
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That law both addressed energy and established Korea’s climate
change agenda. Korea’s energy policy includes forecasting a longterm energy mix and announcing that in the form of the Basic Energy
Plan, which is mandated by the Framework Act.164
The second Basic Energy Plan, adopted in 2014, revised down
the share of nuclear capacity in the previous plan and increased the
share of fossil fuel-fired generation. This was due to the combination
of a nuclear safety scandal in Korea and the Fukushima disaster in
Japan.165
As an electricity policy, the Electricity Utility Act requires
MOTIE to prepare and publish a Basic Plan for Long-term Electricity
Supply and Demand (BPE) every two years. The BPE is a lowerlevel plan within the Basic Energy Plan. It details the policy
direction for the electricity sector, including supply and demand
forecasts, a capacity plan, and infrastructure needs. The most recent
BPE, announced in July 2015, forecasts annual demand growth at
2.2%.166 According to that plan, a total of forty-seven powerplants
are either under construction or are planned for construction, to meet
Korea’s growing electricity demand by 2029. These include thirteen
nuclear reactors, twenty coal plants, and fourteen gas plants, together
totaling 46,487 MW of new installations.167
B. DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY
Since 1990, Korean greenhouse gas emissions have doubled,
with total emissions reaching 572 metric tons in 2013, making Korea
the world’s seventh largest greenhouse gas emitter—and the fastest
growing emission source among the OECD’s thirty-four
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industrialized countries.168 Likewise, Korea’s cumulative emissions
for the past fifty years (1971–2013) rank as eleventh most in the
world.169
In part to address this, Korea has actively promoted “green
growth” initiatives, primarily under the administration of former
President Lee Myung-bak, who took office in 2008. The Lee
administration’s green growth agenda sought to make an active
response to climate change by reducing emissions while also
ensuring energy security and promoting job creation in the field.170
In anticipation of the 2009 climate change summit in
Copenhagen, Korea pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 30%
relative to the country’s projected business-as-usual level by 2020.
In December 2009, the National Assembly then passed the
Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth (Framework Act),
which included various policy measures to mitigate greenhouse
gases. Most notably, this included an emissions trading system,
carbon disclosure, and promotion of renewable energy.171 Based on
the Framework Act, the government later passed the Enforcement
Decree of the Framework Act, which established Korea’s 30% GHG
mitigation target and made that target legally binding.172 The Lee
administration also decided to replace Korea’s prior feed-in-tariff
system with a renewable portfolio standard, beginning in 2012.173
168
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The idea was to stimulate domestic investment in the renewable
energy sector, which the FIT had failed to achieve.174
Following the Lee administration, in 2013, Park Geun-hye
assumed the presidency. Her administration seemed noticeably less
interested in a climate change agenda, especially compared to her
predecessor.
Nonetheless, in January 2014, the government
announced a “Roadmap for Achieving National GHG Reduction
Target,” which laid out detailed implementation plans to meet the
nation’s emissions reduction goal. This Roadmap reconfirmed the
prior reduction targets for each sector of the economy. Specifically,
it projected that Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions will reach 776
million tons of CO2 equivalent by 2020, and stated that the country
will aim to reduce those emissions by 30%, or to 543 million tons of
CO2 equivalent.175 Reduction targets for each of the seven major
economic sectors were set: 34.4% in transport, 26.9% in building,
26.7% in power generation, 18.5% in industry, 12.3% in waste, and
5.2% in agriculture.176
To prepare for the Paris Agreement in 2015, the Korean
government quickly updated the greenhouse emissions reduction
goals. In that regard, the government announced it would reduce its
GHG emissions by 37% from its 2030 emission projection. This
commitment, however, drew criticism from both within and outside
of the country as too weak, especially considering Korea’s significant
contribution to global emissions.177
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Today, to achieve these emissions reduction goals, Korea is
implementing two key systems to alter its electricity sector: an
emissions trading scheme and a renewable portfolio standard.
1. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME
In May 2012, under former president Lee Myung-bak, the
government promulgated the Act on the Allocation and Trading of
Greenhouse Emission Permits, which established a cap-and-trade
emissions trading scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gas emissions.178
This was the first national emission trading scheme in Asia. The
Korean ETS started on January 1, 2015, after two years of delay due
to opposition from industry. The ETS covers facilities emitting more
than 25,000 CO2 equivalent annually, representing 525 of the
country’s largest emitters, or about 68% of national greenhouse gas
emissions.179 The government set emissions caps and reduction
targets for each trading period. Three initial phases have been
outlined. The first phase runs from 2015 to 2017, the second from
2018 to 2020, and the third from 2021 to 2025.180 In the first phase,
all carbon allowances were offered for free. The government will
offer 97% of allowances for free in the second phase and less than
90% in the third phase.181 The remainder will be auctioned.182
Energy-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) companies will receive
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100% of their allowances for free in all phases, a concession made to
address international competitiveness concerns.183
Banking and borrowing of credits is allowed under the ETS,
although borrowing is limited to 10% of all permits.184 Offsets are
also allowed up to 10% of all emissions. Overseas offsets will be
permitted beginning in the third phase.185 The government may also
adjust or cancel allowances under the certain circumstances,
including unexpected facility expansion or shutdown.186 Noncomplying facilities may be penalized in an amount equivalent to or
less than three times the average market prices of allowances, or
KRW 100,000 per ton.187
Just a few months before the ETS was implemented, the new
Park Geun-hye administration loosened the regulation in response to
the business sector.
Specifically, the government increased
allowances by 10% for all sectors above the initial allowance plan.
For the power generation sector, the government set the allowances
to the level of actual mitigations in 2013 and 2014, further reducing
the mitigation burden.188
Initially, the Ministry of Environment was designated as the
single authority to administer and manage the ETS. This included all
key responsibilities—allocation planning, decision of scope of
covered entities, determination of allowances, management of the
allowance register, allowance certification, imposition of fines, and
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fact-finding research.189 However, in February 2016, the government
transferred implementation authority to the Ministry of Strategy and
Finance. The government also designated the Prime Minister’s
Office as the central authority for all climate change-related policy,
instead of the Ministry of Environment. The stated rationale for
these moves was to establish better coordination and implementation
of the climate change policy.190 Yet, many critiqued this new
institutional arrangement as an effort to be more business friendly
while diminishing the role of the Ministry of Environment.191
It is too early to discern the ETS’s impact. In the first year-anda-half of operation, trade under ETS has been limited.192 At the end
of the first year of phase one, total emissions of all facilities covered
by the system were reported to be 542.6 million tons of CO2
equivalent, or about 6.1 million tons of CO2 equivalent less than the
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total allowance cap set by the government.193 This suggests that
there was an over-allocation in the first phase.
2. RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD
Korea’s renewable energy generation is among the lowest in the
OECD.194 In 2013, Korea’s renewable energy use accounted for only
1% of total primary energy supply and 1.6% of total electricity
supply.195 By source, waste and bioenergy account for the majority
of renewable energy production in Korea (60% and 24.3%,
respectively), while solar and wind account for only small fractions
of renewables use (4.7% and 2.1% in 2014).196 A notable feature of
Korean renewable energy law is that it includes non-renewable
resources, including gasified coal, gasified heavy residual oil, and
fuel cells; these are counted as eligible “new energy” resources.197
Further, Korean law defines waste energy to include nonrenewable—and environmentally controversial—industrial waste.
Korea’s broad definition of “new and renewable energy” thus
explains, at least in part, the country’s low reliance on other
renewables, such as wind and solar.198
As noted, the government replaced Korea’s feed-in tariff
mechanism with this renewable portfolio standard in 2012.199
Korea’s RPS scheme requires the largest public and private power
193
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195

740–42.

Id. at 9.
Energy Policies of IEA Countries, supra note 162, at 10, 96.
NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, at

196
See id. at 734–35. In regard to electricity generation, waste
accounts for 53.3%, biomass 17.3%, solar 9.5%, and wind 4.3%.
197
Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of
New and Renewable Energy, Act No. 13087, art. 2, Jan. 28, 2015 (S. Kor.),
translated
in
National
Korean
Law
Information
Center,
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=167700&chrClsCd=010203&urlMo
de=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#000.
198
See NEW & RENEWABLE ENERGY WHITE PAPER, supra note 149, at
734, 740–42 (explaining the discrepancy between domestic and international
renewable energy data). For example, in 2013, the domestic statistics show
that new and renewable energy accounted for 3.52% of all energy supply,
while international statistics estimated the share as 1%.
199
Act on the Promotion of the Development, Use and Diffusion of
New and Renewable Energy, supra note 197, at art. 12.5.

155

companies—those with installed capacity greater than 500 MW—to
steadily increase their use of renewables for electricity generation
through 2022. Specifically, the initial RPS set targets at 2%
electricity from renewables in 2012, elevating to 10% by 2022.200
However, RPS targets are reviewed and adjusted every three years.
As of 2017, the obligated generators include eighteen power
companies, but the RPS’s end target of 10% has been delayed to
2024.201
Compliance under the Korean RPS functions in two ways. First,
in order for power companies to meet their RPS targets, they can
either invest in renewable energy installations themselves or
purchase tradable certificates—RECs—on the market.202 Second,
non-complying power companies must pay a financial penalty up to a
50% above the average market price of RECs for that year.203 The
number of RECs allocated for electricity from renewable sources
varies depending on the technology used, the location, and the size of
the installation.204
Within the general RPS target, the government also set a
mandatory quota for solar PV specifically for each year.205 After
reaching 1,971 GWh of solar PV production, however, the
government concluded that the mandatory quota had sufficiently
facilitated expansion of PV and thus terminated the quota at the end
of 2015.206
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During the first four years of RPS implementation, 6,041 MW of
new eligible generation were installed. This stands in stark contrast
to Korea’s experience with its former FIT regime. The new RPS has
already yielded six times more installations than what the prior FIT
regime led to in ten years of operation.207 The compliance rate of
RPSs has increased from 64.7% in 2012 (4.154 million RECs) to
90.2% in 2015 (12.486 million RECs).208 A close analysis of
compliance patterns shows that generators tend to use energy sources
that are easily accessed and convertible with fossil fuels, such as
imported wood pallets. As a result, wood pallet imports to Korea
have increased at an unprecedented rate,209 and compliance with the
RPS has been achieved mainly by relying on biomass. Compliance
figures for 2014 indicated 32.2% use of biomass, 14.1% use of fuel
cells, 11.6% use of solar PV, and 7.4% use of wind.210
C. CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Today, Korea’s electricity sector accounts for about 35% of
Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions—a sharp increase from 1990,
when it accounted for only 12% of emissions. The electricity sector
thus leads the nation’s overall emissions growth. This growth mainly
resulted from decreased reliance on nuclear power and increased use
of coal plants in Korea, which in 2012 accounted for 77% of GHG
emissions within the sector compared to 48% in 1990.211 More
importantly, coal’s growing prominence in Korea’s energy mix is
only expected to continue under the nation’s long-term energy
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plans.212 The second Basic Energy Plan adopted in 2014, which will
drive Korea’s energy policy through 2035, revised down the share of
nuclear capacity from the previous plan (from 41 to 29%) and
increased the share of fossil fuel energy213—while keeping renewable
energy production at the same level (11%) as in the previous plan.
Further, the government forecasted that total energy demand will
double by 2035, and said that it plans to meet this demand by
installing twenty additional coal plants by 2029.
So far, then, Korea’s climate change policies have had very
limited impact on the nation’s electricity sector. Although Korea’s
new emission trading scheme includes the electricity industry, and its
RPS mandates increased use of renewables for power generation,
those policies have done little to transform the sector to date. There
are several fundamental reasons for this.
First, end-use electricity prices are heavily regulated by the
government and remain artificially low compared to other
economically developed countries.
As a result, electricity
consumption has skyrocketed over the past few decades, with a
growth rate much higher than that of the overall energy sector. This
demand control failure has pushed the government to increase
electricity supply and grant licenses to build new power plants.
Against rising opposition to nuclear energy following the Fukushima
Daiichi disaster in neighboring Japan, Korea plans to meet this
energy demand primarily through new fossil-fuel energy plants.
Second, electricity planning in Korea has not been compatible
with climate change planning. Under the Framework Act on Low
Carbon and Green Growth, green growth plans take top priority, and
energy and climate change plans are subordinate to these economic
goals. Further, energy plans and climate change plans are prepared
separately by different agencies, through different planning
processes. In particular, the Basic Plan for Long Term Electricity
Supply and Demand (BPE) has been prepared and drafted solely by
MOTIE, a government agency with a top policy priority of sufficient
electricity supply and no real focus on the national greenhouse gas
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mitigation target.214
Only in 2013, following a controversy
pertaining to the sixth BPE, which included plans for a massive
expansion in coal plants, did the Electricity Utility Act direct MOTIE
to: (1) “make effort” to align its plans with the national GHG
mitigation target; (2) consult with other ministries, including
Ministry of Environment; and (3) conduct public hearings before
finalizing a plan.215
Third, the cost-based operation of the Korean electricity market
does not give sufficient attention to climate change considerations.
Under the current merit-order dispatch system, which the Korea
Power Exchange uses to identify the generation units that will supply
electricity during each hour and at what price, the generation unit
with the lowest variable cost is awarded first priority of operation.216
Thus, less carbon-intensive gas power plants cannot win bids over
coal plants, and climate emissions are exacerbated.217 As a result,
electricity from gas plants is currently used only during peak times,
when it can supplement coal and nuclear baseload generation.
Therefore, under the current structure of Korea’s electricity
market and policy, major climate change regulations, including the
ETS and RPS, are necessarily constrained in their effects. Until there
is a fundamental change in Korea’s supply-focused electricity policy,
including improved coordination between electricity and climate
change policy planning, Korean dependence on coal will only
continue. Potentially, that change is already coming. A significant
amendment of the Electricity Utility Act, adopted in March 2017 and
set to take effect on June 22, 2017, requires consideration of
214

See Cheolhung Cho & Eui-chan Jeon, Is Energy Policy Compatible
with Climate Change Policy?, 13 KOREAN ENERGY ECON. REV. 199–230
(2014) (showing the projection of GHG emissions according to the sixth
BPE will exceed the 2020 GHG emissions target of the electricity sector,
which is a 26.7 reduction from the BAU scenario); see also IJIN KIM &
SOOCHUL KIM, A Study on National Plans for Greenhouse-gas Reduction,
KOR. ENV’T INST. 87 (2013–17).
215
Electric Utility Act, Act No. 12612, art. 25.2, 25.5, 25.7, May 20,
2014 (S. Kor.), translated in National Korean Law Information Center,
http://www.korealaw.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=154034&chrClsCd=010203&
urlMode=engLsInfoR&viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000.
216
See Korea Electric Power Co., Annual Report, supra note 155, at
30.
217
Natural gas used in Korea is all liquefied natural gas imported by
ship, with a price higher than imported coal.

159

environmental impacts and public safety in both the operation and
planning of the electricity.218 This amendment reflects the growing
concern over the safety of nuclear plants and the deleterious impacts
on air quality from coal plants. The amendment is expected to
change the current electricity dispatch system to encourage operation
of natural gas plants while discouraging coal and nuclear power.
Meanwhile, GHG emissions from the nation’s electricity sector
continue to increase, although the impact of this new amendment
remains to be seen.

V. UNITED STATES
Although the United States has a strong reputation for—and a
long history of—environmental protection, the nation often is seen as
lagging behind in climate change mitigation efforts. This is due in
part to the United States’ significant contribution to global climate
emissions. The United States ranks second globally in greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions,219 consistently comprising about a tenth or
more of worldwide GHG emissions since 1990.220
These
contributions, moreover, are high due in part to the way the United
States regulates electricity. It is well-documented that U.S. energy
governance is fractured and fragmented,221 and that this is
218
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particularly true in the electricity sector, where statutes like the New
Deal-era Federal Power Act222 continue to draw bright lines between
what parts of government can shape the sector and how.223 As a
consequence of this regulatory fragmentation, as well as sharp
divides politically in the United States over what efforts should be
taken to combat climate change, U.S. climate policies have been very
much a piecemeal, start-and-stop proposition. The electricity sector’s
response, in turn, also has been less than uniform. Over roughly the
last decade, the United States seemed increasingly poised to begin
mitigating the climate impacts of its electricity sector, both through
federal efforts like the Clean Power Plan and state efforts such as
renewable portfolio standards. Following the recent election of
Donald J. Trump as president, however, there is now much doubt
about the future of climate regulation in the United States.
A. ELECTRICITY SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE
The U.S. electricity grid is composed of three primary
interconnections: the Western Interconnection, which runs roughly
from the Pacific Ocean to just east of the Continental Divide; the
Eastern Interconnection, which runs from its seam with the Western
Interconnection to the Atlantic Ocean; and the Electricity Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT), which covers much of that state.224 In
addition, Alaska and Hawaii have independent electricity systems
separate from those in the continental United States.225
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Historically, vertically-integrated, investor-owned utilities
dominated electricity service in the United States. Thus, in 1970,
investor-owned utilities served over 78% of retail customers.226 As
part of a larger wave of industrial deregulation and restructuring that
swept the nation beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, however, the
U.S. electricity sector soon began a steady march toward
liberalization.227 It is difficult to say precisely when this effort
began, but it arguably was marked by passage of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).228 That Act sought to
encourage generation diversity by requiring incumbent utilities to
purchase power from so-called “qualifying facilities,” or “QFs,” such
as cogeneration and renewable energy producers. The Energy Policy
Act of 1992 followed,229 which further opened the electricity
generation market to competition by allowing non-utility generators
to supply power without being subject to utility holding company
regulation.230
At the same time, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), the federal agency charged with regulating portions of the
electricity sector, did its own work to liberalize U.S. electricity
markets. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, FERC began allowing
226
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utilities and other entities to sell wholesale electricity at “marketbased” rates—that is, at prices and terms the parties negotiated.231
This was a sharp break from FERC’s traditional practice of
approving individual power purchase agreements one at a time using
cost-of-service regulation under the Federal Power Act’s “just and
reasonable” standard.232 Then, in 1996, FERC pushed the industry
even further toward competition. The agency adopted its landmark
Order No. 888, which required transmission owners to sell excess
capacity on a first-come, first-served basis using standard terms and
conditions.233 The result was a rush to competition for wholesale
electricity. “Order No. 888 amplified the paradigm shift to more
competitive and restructured wholesale electricity markets.”234
While FERC was busy encouraging electricity competition at the
wholesale level, states also joined the fray. As part of the nation’s
federalist system of governance, FERC and states share regulatory
authority over the electricity sector in the United States. FERC has
jurisdiction over wholesale power sales, transmission sales, and
reliability of the bulk power system.235 States have jurisdiction over
retail electricity sales, distribution, siting of facilities, and the
structure of their generation fleets.236 Thus, FERC’s efforts in
promoting competition only went so far. State action was also
needed.
That state action came in the form of a wave of restructuring
efforts in the 1990s. As of 2003, twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia had passed legislation or adopted policies either
requiring or encouraging incumbent utilities to sell off their
generation assets, with the aim of further breaking up the hold of
vertically integrated utilities on the market.237
This had a
231
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meaningful, reinforcing impact on FERC’s policies seeking to
restructure the wholesale market. “In 1996 there [were] about
750,000 Mw of utility-owned electric generating capacity in the U.S.
of which investor-owned utilities (IOUs) accounted for about
580,000 Mw.”238 After 1996, however, “about 100,000 Mw of
generating capacity was divested by IOUs and another 100,000 Mw
transferred to unregulated utility affiliates to compete in the
wholesale market.”239 This quickly ushered in more competition.
Thus, by 2004, roughly 80% of new generating capacity was from
“independent power companies and unregulated affiliates of
utilities.”240
As states adopted these restructuring laws, many also aimed to
bring electricity competition to the retail level. For two reasons,
however, these efforts quickly plateaued. First, the California energy
crisis of 2000, marked conspicuously by the fall of Enron after that
company manipulated prices in western markets, scared off every
other state that was considering restructuring—and convinced some
to abandon the process.241 Second, state efforts to roll out retail
competition were quite uneven and often ineffective. Roughly
twenty states moved to retail competition, and while none of these
reverted to cost-of-service regulation, only four have seen more than
a quarter of their customers switch retail providers: Texas (100%),
Connecticut (44.1%), Ohio (42.2%), and Pennsylvania (31.5%).242
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The result of these decades of changes is that the U.S. electricity
sector today is a mishmash of different systems of governance,
regulation, and competition. Layered on top of the three major
interconnections is a conglomeration of regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) that,
depending on their specific circumstances, are the successors to
historic power pools that utilities had voluntarily formed or are new
creations made to promote competition in the sector. These
organizations, which FERC originally had wanted to force all major
utilities to join,243 operate the grid in many parts of the country and
run formal transmission and generation markets.244 Meanwhile,
beneath this tangle of systems is also significant diversity in how
electricity is provided to ultimate consumers. Some states continue
to run retail competition programs, while most do not.245 Thus,
roughly 61% of retail electricity continues to be delivered by
incumbent utilities, just over 13% comes from cooperatives, and
almost 13% comes from local municipalities, while only the
remainder is provided by new competitors in the market.246
Generation also varies heavily. Coal and natural gas currently
make up the bulk of U.S. electricity production, each comprising
about a third, while nuclear power provides about a fifth, renewables
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comprise 13%, and petroleum accounts for about 1%.247 As Figure 4
details, however, there is substantial geographic diversity in how
electricity is produced in the U.S. today.
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FIGURE 4. U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY REGION AND
SOURCE – 2016248
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In short, then, what best typifies the electricity sector in the U.S.
is complexity at the national level in terms of how the sector operates
and is governed, and divergence at the state level in terms of how
that governance and operation is implemented. Those trends also
play out in how the United States has chosen to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from electricity use.
B. DOMESTIC CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY
Despite being responsible for a sizeable portion of global

248
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greenhouse gas emissions,249 the United States’ leadership on climate
change has been quite tenuous over time. This can be seen perhaps
most readily in the nation’s interface with global climate change
mitigation efforts. While the United States joined 153 other
countries in ratifying the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in 1992250—the Kyoto Protocol, as it
is more commonly known—the country failed to take further action
five years later when the world made its first concrete effort to
implement that agreement.
Instead, President Clinton never
submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification because it
appeared clear it would fail in that chamber.251 This was part of why
so many subsequent efforts were necessary to implement the Kyoto
Protocol at the international level: one of the biggest contributors to
GHGs failed to put enforceable regulatory mechanisms in place.252
Eventually, those efforts climaxed at the end of 2015 with the
creation of the Paris Accord.253 Again, the United States joined the
249
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agreement but did not send it to the Senate for ratification, with
President Obama taking the position that because it was not a new
treaty, but rather merely an “extension of existing obligations” under
the UNFCCC, it did not require Senate advice and consent, and could
simply be implemented via executive order.254
This kind of international ambivalence toward climate change is
reflective of the fractured public perception of the problem
domestically. While a significant portion of U.S. residents favor
action on climate change, many oppose it, with some of those
denying that climate change even exists or that human actions are
driving it.255 As recent surveys have indicated, 65% of Americans
worry about climate change a great deal or a fair amount, with the
same portion of the population blaming human activity for rising
temperatures.256 But only 45% of Americans consider climate
change a very serious problem.257 Moreover, 16% of U.S. residents
do not believe there is solid scientific evidence to support a finding
that climate change is caused by humans.258
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In turn, these public divisions over climate change have
translated into legislative gridlock at the federal level.259 From 1999
to 2014, over 1,163 climate-oriented bills were introduced in
Congress; however, no comprehensive legislation was enacted.260
This was not for lack of trying. Most prominent among these
failed efforts was the American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009, also known as H.R. 2454 or the Waxman-Markey Bill. This
bill would have established an economy-wide, greenhouse gas capand-trade system, with a goal of reducing GHG emissions by 17%
from 2005 levels by 2020, and 83% by 2050.261 Although WaxmanMarkey passed the House of Representatives by a 219-to-212 vote in
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June 2009, the bill then languished in the Senate,262 effectively
ending action on climate legislation for the 111th Congress.263
In the vacuum created by Congress’ failure to adopt
comprehensive climate legislation, two key efforts have been made
to address the problem in the United States. First, states and other
subnational forms of government have stepped into the breach,
adopting a wide array of policies of their own.264 Second, at the
federal level, Congress has passed a number of measures that deal
with climate change around the edges and, more prominently, the
Obama administration invoked its executive power to address climate
change directly. Of course, with the Obama administration now out
of office, the future of its extensive legacy on climate action is very
much in doubt, particularly following issuance of the Trump
administration’s March 28, 2017 executive order on climate
change.265
1. SUBNATIONAL CLIMATE ACTION
Subnational action on climate change in the U.S. electricity
sector can be divided into five primary categories: efforts to
(1) establish greenhouse gas emission targets or industry-specific
limits; (2) mandate GHG emissions reporting;266 (3) impose
renewable energy production targets; (4) encourage GHG emission
reductions through energy efficiency measures; and (5) develop
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climate change adaptation plans.267 As a complement to these
individual strategies, many states have banded together to cooperate
regionally in an effort to drive down GHG emissions.
First, some states have established GHG emission reduction
objectives, doing so in two primary ways: through economy-wide
emission targets or by imposing GHG emission reduction limits on
the energy sector specifically.268 Of these, economy-wide emission
targets are the most common.269 For instance, California has set
economy-wide GHG emission targets to revert to 1990 levels by
2020.270 By contrast, in New York, new or expanded baseload plants
(25 MW and larger) must meet an emission rate of either 925 lbs
CO2/MWh (output-based) or 120 lbs CO2/MMBTU (input-based),
while non-baseload plants must meet an emission rate of either 1450
lbs CO2/MWh (output-based) or 160 lbs CO2/MMBTU (inputbased).271 In all, nineteen states have adopted economy-wide
emission targets, and fourteen states have adopted GHG emission
standards for the electricity sector.272
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Second, and less aggressively, states have adopted policies
requiring major source polluters, including the electricity sector, to
report their greenhouse gas emissions. Twenty-two states and the
District of Columbia are part of the Climate Registry, a tool to
measure, track, verify, and publicly report greenhouse gas emissions
consistently and transparently between states.273 In New Mexico, for
instance, all major sources that have potential to emit more than 100
tons/year of criteria pollutants are required to report their CO2,
methane, and nitrous oxide emissions to the EPA or to New
Mexico’s Air Quality Bureau.274
Third, more than two-thirds of states have imposed requirements
on their electric utilities to produce a given percentage of power from
renewable energy resources.275 While these renewable portfolio
standards are not climate change mitigation tools per se, combatting
climate change is clearly one of the key goals that they embody.
Moreover, RPSs epitomize other subnational climate legislation in
the United States in their sheer diversity.276 Indeed, these laws vary
from state to state in how much renewable generation they require,277
when such goals must be met,278 and whether they target only leastcost renewables or also seek to promote more emergent technologies
273
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like solar,279 to name just a few RPS design features that differ
significantly across jurisdictions.280 Notwithstanding this variety,
RPSs have had a meaningful impact on climate mitigation in the
United States: the U.S. Department of Energy has estimated that
RPSs contributed “$2.2 billion in benefits . . . from reduced
greenhouse gas emissions and $5.2 billion from reductions in other
air pollution” in 2013 alone.281 Today, twenty-nine states, the
District of Columbia, and three territories have adopted mandatory
RPSs, while eight states and one territory have adopted voluntary
RPSs, or “renewable portfolio goals” (RPGs).282
Fourth, states have adopted a number of measures aimed at
promoting efficiency in electricity use.283 These include setting new
minimum efficiency standards for appliances and lighting,284
implementing construction standards and building codes for new
buildings, and encouraging onsite generation, also known as
distributed generation.285 Today, twenty-six states have Energy
Efficiency Resource Standards (EERS) in place, which impose
efficiency targets similar to how RPSs impose renewable energy
production quotas.286 In 2015, savings from electricity efficiency
programs totaled approximately 26.5 million megawatt-hours
279
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(MWh), a 3.1% increase over 2014.287 This was the equivalent of
reducing total retail electricity sales by about 0.7%.288
Fifth, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have
adopted—or established processes for adopting—broader climate
change adaption plans.289 These plans typically include research and
education, as well as planning to improve societal resilience to
climate change, incuding the idea of climate change adaptation.290
On the electricity side of the ledger, some states, like California, are
recommending that utilities formulate vulnerability assessments and
resilience plans as the first steps towards climate change mitigation
efforts.291
Others, like New Jersey, are making additional
infrastructure investments to increase resiliency against extreme
weather events.292 In total, twenty-nine states have included
electricity policies or recommendations in their climate change
adaption plans, ranging from RPSs for sources used in electricity
generation to retrofitting traditional electricity facilities and reducing
electricity waste.293
Beyond these state efforts, many jurisdictions have banded
together to form regional climate change collaborations. There are
six current regional or multi-state climate initiatives in the United
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States,294 all primarily designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and spur public and private investment in clean energy, energy
efficiency, and sustainable infrastructure. The Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), comprised of Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont, was the first cooperative effort to cap
and reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector.295 In an effort to
reduce GHG emissions, each participating state created individual
CO2 Budget Trading Programs and independent regulations, based on
the RGGI Model Rule and the Summary of RGGI Model Rule
Changes.296 These programs limit CO2 emissions from electric
power plants, set CO2 allowances, and frame participation in regional
CO2 allowance auctions.297 In 2012, the RGGI set a cap of ninetyone million short tons of CO2 equivalent, with the cap declining 2.5%
each year from 2015 through 2020.298 In all, RGGI cut CO2
emissions by 36%, or fifty million short tons, from 2008 to 2014.299
The other regional initiatives include: the Western Climate Initiative,
the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, North American
2050, the Pacific Coast Collaborative, and the Transportation and
Climate Initiative.300 While most of these operate similarly to the
RGGI, there is variety among the groups, with some focusing on
low-carbon development301 and others on reducing greenhouse gases
in the transportation sector302 or coordinating collaboration with
multiple regional initiatives.303
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2. FEDERAL CLIMATE ACTION
As states rose up to address climate change, federal action also
eventually came, primarily through President Obama’s executive
action in the absence of comprehensive climate regulation. This
federal action falls into two broad categories with respect to the
electricity sector: (1) direct regulation and (2) indirect regulation.
Direct federal regulation of the electricity sector’s climate
emissions began in 2013, under the Obama administration’s umbrella
Climate Action Plan (CAP).304 This plan established the goal of
cutting the 2005 carbon pollution levels by 17% by 2020.305 For
electricity, President Obama directed the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to build on “the successful first-term effort
to develop greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards for cars and
trucks” and “state leadership” in order “to work expeditiously to
complete carbon pollution standards for both new and existing power
plants” and to “double renewable electricity generation once again by
2020.”306 Thus, the EPA began putting in place a number of
programs and new regulatory initiatives to achieve this goal. The
EPA primarily relied on the Clean Air Act (CAA) to implement these
programs, which, in 2007, the Supreme Court held covers GHG
emissions.307
The first of these regulatory initiatives were the so-called “new
source” rules, which apply CO2 emissions standards to new,
modified, and reconstructed facilities, including power plants.308
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Developed under Section 111(b) of the CAA, the new source rules
impose emissions performance standards to achieve “the best system
of emission reduction (BSER)” available for “each type of unit.”309
Specifically, the new source rules set separate standards for both new
natural gas and new coal plants. For the former, the rules limit
emissions to “no more than 1,000 lbs” of CO2/MWh, and for the
latter, to “no more than 1,400 lbs” CO2/MWh.310 Effectively, this
means that new coal plants cannot be built in the United States
without employing carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.311
On the heels of the new source rules, the EPA also promulgated
regulations addressing existing power plants. These rules—known
more commonly as the Clean Power Plan (CPP)—were finalized in
August 2015 and seek to reduce CO2 emissions from existing fossil
fuel-fired power plants by 32% by 2030.312 The CPP set this target
on a state-by-state basis, using three “building blocks” for CO2
emission reductions that it said meets the CAA’s BSER standard:313
improving the heat rate of existing coal-fired power plants,
substituting lower emission generation (i.e., natural gas) for higher
emitting generation (i.e., coal), and increasing electricity generation
from new zero-emitting renewable energy sources.314 Although the
EPA used these building blocks to establish emissions targets, states
are free to use any strategy to reduce their emissions, including
energy efficiency and nuclear generation.315 States must develop
plans to reach compliance with the CPP, and those plans must be
approved by the EPA. In establishing their plans, states may choose
whether to meet the mass-based or rate-based emission goals set
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forth in the CPP.316 Although the CPP was initially met with
enthusiastic fanfare from the U.S. environmental community, it was
immediately challenged in court,317 with the Supreme Court taking
the extraordinary step of staying the rule on February 9, 2016.318
At the same time the federal government was adopting measures
to directly regulate climate emissions from the electricity sector, a
bevy of other federal rules also began to impact the way—and the
level at which—the sector produces GHG emissions. Key among
these is the EPA’s 2011 Mercury and Air Toxic Standard (MATS),
which limits the emission of mercury, acid gases, and other toxic
pollutants from power plants.319 Although not a climate regulatory
tool per se, these limits clearly have impacted GHG emissions in the
United States. Since the rule targets air pollution from coal- and oilfired power plants,320 it is projected that 60 GW of coal-fired capacity
subject to MATS will retire between 2012 and 2020.321
Likewise, the United States has a number of other longstanding
federal measures in place that influence GHG emissions from the
electricity sector by promoting production of power from renewable
energy sources.
These measures include the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978, which provides incentive
rates to renewable energy producers, although the Energy Policy Act
of 2005 significantly circumscribed the scope of this law.322 Also
316
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relevant are tax incentives for renewable electricity production, most
prominently an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) benefiting solar
technology, fuel cells, and small wind turbines,323 and a Production
Tax Credit (PTC) for a wider array of renewables.324 The current tax
credit regime has worked best for more “mature industries that
generate steady flows of taxable income to offset,” although some
have called for tax credit reform that will more effectively promote
renewable energy.325
Despite these efforts to combat climate change taken during the
Obama administration, there is now significant question whether any
of these measures will persist. On November 9, 2016, Donald J.
Trump was elected as the forty-fifth president of the United States.
While details of his energy policies are only beginning to emerge,
from the outset it has been clear that the new administration will seek
to abruptly discontinue President Obama’s climate initiatives. Prior
to the election, Donald Trump suggested via social media that
“Global warming is a total, and very expensive, hoax!”326 As Mr.
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Trump tweeted on November 6, 2012, “The concept of global
warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S.
manufacturing non-competitive.”327 Then, during his campaign for
the White House, Mr. Trump pledged to “rescind all the jobdestroying Obama executive actions including the Climate Action
Plan” and “cancel the Paris Climate Agreement and stop all
payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N. global warming programs.”328
Following the inauguration, the Trump administration appeared
unready to back down from these promises, pledging on the White
House home page to “eliminat[e] harmful and unnecessary policies
such as the Climate Action Plan . . . and to reviv[e] America’s coal
industry, which has been hurting for too long.”329 Meanwhile, the
new administration has methodically removed mentions of climate
change, the Paris Accord, and the Obama Climate Action plan from
EPA websites.330
Yet, precisely how the new administration will proceed remains
unclear. Shortly after the election, then-President-Elect Trump noted
that there is “‘some connectivity’ between human activity and rising
global temperatures,” and he suggested that he would keep “an open
mind” concerning the United States’ involvement to Paris climate
accord.331 Moreover, while presidents have much latitude in setting
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policy agendas, regulations already in place cannot be simply spirited
away, as the repeal of rules is subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).332
Nonetheless, and
notwithstanding the limits of the APA and the risk of judicial review,
on March 28, 2017, the Trump administration issued an executive
order directly targeting the Obama-era climate rules. The executive
order mandates all agency heads to “review all existing regulations,
orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency
actions . . . . that potentially burden the development or use of
domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to
oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources.”333 The idea, of
course, is that such review will lead to modification or recission of
Executive Branch rules addressing climate emissions, including from
the electricity sector. Indeed, the executive order affirmately
rescinds a number of President Obama’s climate actions, including
the Climate Action Plan itself as well as his June 25, 2013
presidential memorandum on Power Sector Carbon Pollution
Standards.334
Further, the executive order directs the EPA
administrator to review the final rule implementing the Clean Power
Plan and “if appropriate, . . . as soon as practicable, suspend, revise,
or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed
rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules.”335
C. CLIMATE REGULATORY IMPACTS ON THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Although the United States recently has taken a number of
prominent measures, both federal and sub-federal, to address climate
change emissions from the electricity sector, the impact of these
policies is not as clear. Further, because the new presidential
administration has already cast a large shadow over the Obama
administration’s climate change efforts, even more uncertainty exists
about what the future of climate regulation in the U.S. electricity
sector will be.
One thing that is clear is that how the United States produces
electricity has changed significantly over the last decade in at least
332
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two regards. First, the use of coal for electricity production has
decreased substantially, while natural gas has made up a good portion
of that difference. Thus, as Figure 5 details, coal comprised 50% or
more of U.S. electricity production from 1991 through 2005, but the
next year, it dipped to 49%, and it has not ticked back up above that
marker since. In 2016, coal fell to a modern low, making up only
30% of U.S. electric generation. At the same time, natural gas use
has steadily risen. That fuel, which previously had been banned for
use in electricity production,336 comprised between 12% and 19% of
generation between 1991 and 2005, finally breaking the 20% mark in
2005. By 2015, it matched coal’s role, accounting for 33% of
electricity production, and in 2016, it surpassed the amount of
generation from coal, comprising 34% of the nation’s electricity
production. This is important from a climate change perspective
because CO2 emissions from natural gas are roughly 50 to 60 percent
lower than from coal.
Second, renewable energy use has steadily risen in the last
decade, albeit not as dramatically as has natural gas. While
hydropower has remained relatively constant, ranging from 9% of
production in 1991 to 7% in 2016—and while nuclear also has quite
consistently contributed about one-fifth of U.S. production—nonhydro renewables have increased their share of generation year over
year, like gas, also beginning around 2006. Until that year, nonhydro renewables accounted for 2% of production. Beginning in
2007, however, renewables made up 3% of production, and in 2016
comprised over 8%—notably, more than hydropower.

336
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FIGURE 5. U.S. ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION BY SOURCE OVER
TIME337
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Importantly, while lower GHG-emitting sources, like natural gas
and renewables, have been growing in prominence in the United
States, and higher emitting sources, namely coal, have been
diminishing, it is not clear that the shifts in American electricity
generation hinge on climate regulation as such.338 Rather, the sharp
uptick in natural gas use is clearly linked to two key, non-climaterelated trends: the opening up of the wholesale electricity market to
competition in the 1990s and, even more critically, the shale gas
boom from the rise of hydraulic fracturing technology in this century,
which drove natural gas prices to historic lows. The cold facts of
these economics encouraged electricity producers to use more gas
and less coal, with some large utilities affirmatively retrofitting
existing coal facilities to burn gas instead. Likewise, while the
growth of non-hydro renewables appears to be driven at least in part
by the adoption of pro-renewable laws like RPSs or the extension of
pertinent tax credits, those laws must be characterized as only
partially climate regulatory measures.
Drops in renewable
technology costs also clearly are playing a role in the growth of these
resources, particularly solar and wind.
It should not be surprising, then, that even as lower-GHG
generation sources grew in stature in the American electricity
generation fleet, the proportion of GHG emissions coming from the
U.S. electricity sector did not decrease. The electricity sector has
accounted for the largest portion of net U.S. GHG emissions in every
year since 1990, when the EPA began reporting numbers: 33% in
1990, 37% in 2005, 33% in 2010, and 34% in 2014.339 Still, changes
in the electricity generation fleet are reflected in that sector’s GHG
emissions. U.S. electricity sector emissions peaked in 2007, at
2454.1 MMT CO2 equivalent, and have decreased every year since
then, reaching as low as 2060.7 in 2012 and 2080.7 in 2014—the
smallest total for the sector since 1996–97.340 This is because
338
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growing consumption, driven in large part by growing population, is
one of the key factors keeping emissions from the electricity sector at
such a high proportional level.

VI. THE SHAPE OF CLIMATE REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY:
EMERGING LESSONS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
Although there are clear limits in what lessons can be drawn
about the scope and trajectory of climate regulation internationally
from four case studies, a comparison of the experiences in Australia,
Great Britain, Korea, and the United States has much to teach. While
understanding climate regulation of the electricity sector in these
jurisdictions does not give a comprehensive picture of law and policy
efforts worldwide, it does provide a useful, and somewhat expansive,
view of both the types of regulatory tools in use and the impact these
devices are having. Thus, such a comparision also gives some
perspective on the overall shape of climate regulation in the
electricity sector, both extant and potential, worldwide.
Gaining this cross-jurisdictional perspective is useful for a
number of reasons, including that jurisdictions may wish to borrow
tools from each other, may choose not to implement a given policy
when it is clear it has failed elsewhere, and may improve how they
regulate by learning from others’ experiences. Moreover, the use of
policy devices and their effects in Australia, the United Kingdom,
South Korea, and the United States align remarkably well in a range
of respects, thus highlighting several generalizations worth noting
about climate regulation of the electricity sector.
Most conspicuous of these is that these jurisdictions adopted a
diverse set of measures to address climate emissions in their
electricity sectors. This should make sense given the equally diverse
set of political, physical, economic, and social contexts in which
jurisdictions regulate. But at the same time, each of the jurisdictions
surveyed underwent significant—and rapid—change in their policies.
That such policy change is so prevalent reveals a third lesson offered
by the case studies, namely, that climate regulation is bound to be
influenced by a wide array of outside forces, just as the electricity
sector itself is. Finally, the overall design, including the design
details, of this regulation appear to matter very much, something that
should stay at the forefront of the conversation as lawmakers
continue to evolve their regulatory programs over time.
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A. POLICY DIVERSITY
It should come as little surprise that the variety of regulatory
tools used to address GHG emissions in the electricity sector is quite
wide, even when looking at just four jurisdictions. While all four of
the countries surveyed are heavily industrialized and major economic
players on the world stage, these jurisdictions also differ in a number
of key respects. The socio-political cultures of Australia, the United
Kingdom, Korea, and the United States are somewhat divergent. The
countries had very different fuel mixes heading into their efforts to
impose climate regulation on their electricity sectors. And while
competition is prevalent in three of the countries (Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States), one utilizes a statesponsored utility that runs much like a monopoly to provide power to
its citizens (Korea).341 Policy diversity, in short, should be expected.
Nonetheless, the amount of diversity among the four
jurisdictions is noteworthy. Australia currently uses a voluntary
emissions reduction scheme,342 while the UK has a legally binding
GHG reduction target and participates in the EU emissions trading
scheme as part of its effort to meet its EU emissions reductions
obligation.343 By contrast, the United States failed to adopt any
comprehensive climate scheme at the national level, neither a trading
scheme nor a carbon tax,344 even as Korea instituted the first national
cap-and-trade mechanism for GHG emissions in Asia.345
Similarly, these countries employed a variety of different policy
devices to promote renewable energy, all in part as a way to reduce
climate emissions, although it is noteworthy that all four of the
countries have used quota mechanisms, such as RPSs, while feed-in
tariffs were more popular across the globe. Australia uses what is
effectively a two-part renewable portfolio standard requirement,346
and Korea likewise implemented a system-wide renewable energy
mandate in the same vein.347 The UK previously imposed a similar
Renewable Obligation, but it is now phasing that mechanism out in
favor of a tendering regime referred to as “contracts for
341
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344
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346
347
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difference,”348 with some feed-in tariffs in place for smaller
renewables. Meanwhile, the United States repeatedly failed to adopt
a nationwide RPS but instead relied on widespread, but not uniform,
state laws, federal tax credits, and piecemeal implementation of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, a precursor to modern feed-in
tariffs, and that, today, now looks much like a watered-down version
of a FIT.349
The United States, indeed, stands apart from Australia, the
United Kingdom, and Korea in several respects in its approach to
climate regulation for its focus on subnational rather than federal
efforts. While there are certainly criticisms that can be leveled
against the policies of the other jurisdictions, they at least have taken
the first step of developing and implementing a coordinated, national
approach to reducing GHG emissions from the electricity sector. The
United States, instead, relies heavily on uncoordinated state (and
sometimes regional) policies, which by definition leave large swaths
of the country’s electricity sector untouched by climate regulation.350
The Obama Administration sought to plug these holes by adopting
regulations under the auspices of its Climate Action Plan, but less
than three full months into the Trump administration, that Plan is
already on the table to be undone.351
B. POLICY CONVULSION
It is somewhat difficult to conjure the correct word to describe
the course of climate regulation of the electricity sector over the
relatively short time in which that regulation has applied.
“Evolution” does not capture the speed of the change;
“transubstantiation” perhaps overstates the degree to which the
regulations have morphed. The phrase “policy convulsion,” then,
may be a useful if imperfect descriptor, for its conveyance of the idea
that the climate regulatory regimes in the electricity sector appear to
be changing sharply, rapidly, and repeatedly.
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To be sure, each of the four jurisdictions surveyed has already
seen this change in a number of respects. Australia went from using
a quite effective emissions trading scheme, to repealing it, to
replacing it with its current policy, the Emissions Reduction Fund.352
In so doing, Australia moved from a mandatory regime to a voluntary
one, and from a more national policy to one where the subnational
Australian states and territories are now adopting their own laws to
help try to fill the gap.353
Similarly, the UK charted a rather circuitous route as it seeks to
find the right balance in promoting renewable energy, a key
component of its effort to bring electricity sector GHG emissions
down. That effort began with the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation in
1990, a bidding regime that was subsequently replaced by the quotabased Renewable Obligation, which then had added to it feed-in
tariffs.354 And now, these tools are being phased out to be replaced
with the CfD, bringing the jurisdiction full circle back to the NFFO
in many ways, by using auctions to try to meet its renewable energy
targets.355
Korea and the United States cut similar pictures by making sharp
changes to their climate regulation of the electricity sector over time.
Following the example of many European jurisdictions, Korea
adopted a feed-in tariff to much fanfare, only to quickly abandon it in
favor of an RPS.356 Likewise, in the United States a cycle of efforts
to adopt federal legislation, followed by state innovations to try to
make up for congressional gridlock, then federal executive action,
and now likely federal executive withdrawal, mark the very uneven
path of how that nation has sought to address electricity industry
climate emissions.357
Of course, there are socio-political, context-specific reasons for
each of these changes, reasons that necessarily differ from one
jurisdiction to the next. However, the fact that all four of the nations
surveyed here have already undergone such substantial change in a
rather short period of time is itself illuminating. It underscores the
tentative approach many countries continue to have toward regulating
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climate change, both in the electricity sector and more broadly—and
the tenuous position of those regulations once they are adopted.
C. ELECTRICITY SHIFTS AND NON-POLICY FACTORS
Another lesson made clear by the experience of the four
jurisdictions surveyed here is that while climate policies certainly can
have a meaningful impact on the electricity sector, these laws must
always be understood in the broader context in which they operate.
That is, other factors besides direct climate regulation clearly
influence the electricity mix. This certainly was borne out as each of
the countries surveyed here began to implement their climate
regulations, and it perhaps is even more evident as electricity systems
worldwide
are
undergoing
other
significant
economic
transformations today.
Importantly, external forces influencing the electricity system do
not necessarily enhance, or restrain, the effectiveness of climate
regulation. They cut both ways. Thus, notwithstanding its climate
policies, the high cost of importing natural gas compared to coal has
driven a stronger proportion of the latter resource in Korea’s
generation mix, and consequently, higher GHG emissions.358 By
contrast, the United States was able to reduce the proportion of coal
in its generation fleet, despite its lack of national GHG emissions
limits, largely because the shale gas boom has made that resource so
cost-effective and thus attractive to utilities.359
Similarly, nations must recognize that while their electricity
systems may be islanded off from other jurisdictions physically, they
are not isolated from the effects of distant policy decisions. The
United Kingdom, for instance, has seen an increase in wind and other
renewables as policies across Europe have helped make those
resources more affordable,360 just as the falling cost of solar PV
following the proliferation of European feed-in tariffs helped
Australia become a leader in distributed generation.361 Likewise,
there is clear cross-pollination of policies across jurisdictions. RPSs
in the United States, for instance, have become more nuanced in
358
359
360
361

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part V.C.
Cf. supra Parts III.B.–C.
Cf. supra Part II.

190

recent years, in part to promote solar power, which itself is partially a
response to highly granular European feed-in tariffs,362 while the
United Kingdom’s own RO similarly was amended in 2009 to
become more “banded.”363
These are but a few aspects of the larger socio-legal-physical
ecosystem in which climate regulations operate. Recognizing that
this ecosystem exists, and influences policy, is a key observation—
and one that this Article’s juxtaposition of these four jurisdictions
points up well.
Nonetheless, it is also true that there are commonalities across
jurisdictions showing the limits to the efficacy of climate regulation.
Given that many electricity regulatory systems, including the marketbased systems of the jurisdictions studied here, emphasize price as an
inherent end-goal, recognizing the wider forces at play in how
electricity systems are developing today is critical. That is, climate
regulation does not aim to fundamentally rewrite how energy law or
utility regulation as a whole operates. Instead, it seeks only to
modify or tweak it, giving a “price” of some kind to carbon where
one did not previously exist. But in a system where low prices are
preferred, any effort to increase costs will always remain in tension
with the larger legal system—and global forces may dictate what
those costs are, irrespective of what any one nation decides to do
with its own climate regulation. All four countries examined here
have experienced this to some degree.
D. CLIMATE PERFORMANCE AND POLICY DESIGN
At the same time that it is clear climate regulation of electricity
operates in a much larger fabric of physical, economic, and legal
systems, it is equally plain that the presence of these laws matters.
Their content matters as well.
The first point—that climate regulation actually has impacted the
electricity sector—is perhaps obvious, but it is important
nevertheless. It is also consistent with the literature,364 and it is
362
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demonstrated across each of the jurisdictions analyzed here. Part of
how the United Kingdom was able to meet its GHG emission target
emissions, for instance, is by growing the share of both natural gas
and renewables in its generation mix.365 More dramatically,
Australia’s former Emissions Trading Scheme drove down the use of
coal for power production, whereas the lifting of that mandate and its
replacement with a voluntary scheme led immediately to an uptick in
coal consumption, as well as the failure of electricity producers to
participate.366 A more blatant example of the impact of a regulation’s
influence is hard to imagine.
Still, simply regulating GHG emissions from electricity is
unlikely to be enough by itself. It also matters how those regulations
are designed and implemented, as the experiences in Australia, the
UK, Korea, and the United States emphasize. In the United States,
for instance, the historically state-by-state nature of climate
regulation consistently presents the risk that emissions reductions in
one jurisdiction may simply be offset by emissions growth in another
jurisdiction367—what some scholars have referred to as “policy
leakage.”368 Likewise, projections show that what impact the Clean
Power Plan might have on the electricity mix depends heavily on
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which compliance mechanisms states choose, with natural gas
growth and efficiency measures in particular having a strong
interplay.369 Yet perhaps the starkest example of the importance
electricity climate policy design comes from South Korea. There,
because the nation’s RPS defines what counts as “renewable” quite
broadly, wood pallet imports—rather than homegrown wind or solar
installations—are serving as the dominant fuel used for regulatory
compliance.370

VII. CONCLUSION
This is the most exciting time to be involved in electricity since
the dawn of the industry. Much today is changing, rapidly, from
global electrification to increased competition, from disruption from
distributed generation to the sudden, unexpected emergence of
natural gas as not just a “bridge” fuel to a clean energy economy but
also a dominant force based on economics alone. The electricity
industry, it increasingly seems clear, is very much in a time of
transition.
There is no doubt that part of this transition is driven by
governments seeking to quell the rising tide of climate emissions
from the industry. From a global perspective, this is a daunting
enough task, particularly as both general demand growth as well as
the industrialization and increased electrification of developing and
other countries means that even major shifts in generation portfolios
can be easily overwhelmed.
This Article shows that even for developed, alreadyindustrialized jurisdictions willing to make concerted efforts to
reshape electricity generation, achieving meaningful and lasting
reductions in climate emissions is no easy endeavor. There are
myriad policies to choose from; once that choice is made, policy and
legal change seems inevitable; and climate regulation does not
operate in a vacuum, but rather, a much larger, messier, and
complicated socio-legal context—including interactions with
traditional energy law that in many jurisdictions by its nature
intrinsically preferences price risk over climate risk.
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As we look to the future of climate regulation of the electricity
industry, then, one thing above all else seems certain. Many
challenges remain.

